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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article speculates on one possible, albeit controversial, an-
swer to the problem of economic development in developing
countries: whether so-called intellectual property piracy by re-
sidents of developing countries' is an efficient engine of economic devel-
opment and whether these unlicensed uses in the developing world
should be tacitly tolerated, if not actively encouraged, by the more eco-
nomically developed nations as a substitute for increased direct foreign
aid or compensated-licensed technology transfer. Whether the modern-
international intellectual property regime promotes innovation and eco-
nomic progress in developing countries is passionately contested from dif-
fering perspectives of the ideological divide. Regardless of one's position
on the role of intellectual property as an economic development issue,
one must agree that economic development in developing nations is a
critical concern. 2
The Article starts with the generally accepted position that every coun-
try that has become a developed country did so by free riding on the
intellectual property of citizens of more developed countries. This Arti-
cle contends that the most useful conceptualization of unlicensed uses of
intellectual property in developing countries is to value these uses at a
fair market local purchasing power cost, to consider them as a form of
foreign aid or as a developmental subsidy and to reject the pejorative
term "piracy." Moreover, it is improbable that any direct fiscal subsidy,
1. This Article uses the term developing country to "describe a nation with a low level
of material well-being (not to be confused with third world countries).... Countries with
more advanced economies than other developing nations, but which have not yet fully
demonstrated the signs of a developed country, are categorized under the term newly in-
dustrialized countries." See Developing Country, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Developing-country (last updated Jan. 24, 2010). This is not a static concept. Some coun-
tries may be economically developed in one region while merely a developing country in
other areas. George Sadowsky, The Internet Society and Developing Countries, ON THE
INTERNET (November/December 1996), http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/1196/sadowsky.
html. Needless to say, economic development leading to a diverse industrial economy as
improving the material well-being of developing nations is a normative concept.
2. See SUSAN E. RICE, ET AL., CONFRONTING POVERTY: WEAK STATES AND U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY 16 (2010).
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such as foreign aid, can be as economically efficient as the developmental
subsidy created in response to the marketplace demand for uncompen-
sated transfers of intellectual property. This nuanced understanding of
the role of intellectual property in developing countries is based on the
history and experiences of now-developed, industrialized Western nations
during the 19th century when they proudly and defiantly used uncompen-
sated and unauthorized transfers of intellectual property as a tool of eco-
nomic development on their road to industrialization.3 Lamentably,
these same acts, which when done by currently developing nations, are
now castigated as piracy.
4
Any attempt to define the term "piracy" is problematic and should be
avoided because, in the context of intellectual property law and foreign
relations policy debates, the term piracy is semiotically free-floating.
5
Further, the term piracy is often the unfortunate victim of varying defini-
tions created to meet the rhetorical interests of each speaker. 6 As one
prominent scholar observed: "What is piracy? It is not entirely clear that
we agree on the answer. An official study for the European Union once
defined it rather impishly as whatever the knowledge industries said they
needed protection from."'7 The characterization of any unauthorized use
of intellectual property as piracy presupposes an enforceable property
right that exists under national law or treaty obligations or is otherwise
unexcused under the flexibilities contained in the international agree-
ments that create the norms of international and domestic intellectual
property law. Moreover, uncompensated uses in developing countries-
once properly constrained to protect the utilitarian incentives that justify
intellectual property protection in developed countries-are an economi-
cally efficient form of foreign aid that benefits both developed and devel-
oping countries.8
3. ADRIAN JOHNS, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates
6-7 (2009).
4. See SANJAYA LALL, INDICATORS OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF IPRs IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 9-10 (2003). Professor Lall observed that "[t]he available historical
and cross-section evidence supports the presumption that the need for IPRs varies with the
level of development. Many rich countries used weak IPR protection in their early stages
of industrialization to develop local technological bases, increasing protection as they ap-
proached the leaders." Id. at 11.
5. JOHNS, supra note 3, at 6.
6. Throughout this Article, the terms "uncompensated technology transfers" or "un-
licensed use(s)" refer to the use of intellectual property without the authorization of the
intellectual property rights holder and implies that these uses are not otherwise legally
excused. Under this formulation, an unauthorized "fair use" of intellectual property is not
an uncompensated transfer because it is a lawful use even without the rights holder's con-
sent. Piracy presupposes a property right, an identifiable owner, and a loss of property.
So, to avoid the moral connotations of theft or illegality, this Article, calls these acts of
unauthorized technology transfer by a more neutral term-uncompensated technology
transfers. On the other hand, intellectual property rights holders may prefer the blunter
semiotically loaded term of piracy to describe these unauthorized uses.
7. See JOHNS, supra note 3, at 6.
8. Even in developed countries, free-riding on intellectual property is the norm. WIL-
LIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH
MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 135 (2002). William Baumol suggested that "some 80 percent of
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This Article then focuses on the effects of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) on developing economies as effectively closing off unli-
censed uses of technology as one possible avenue to economic develop-
ment. This Article does not address the equally important, if not more
important, bilateral free-trade agreements between developed and devel-
oping countries, in which the structural barriers to economic develop-
ment identified in this Article are exacerbated. Developed countries
often obtain such agreements through one-on-one negotiations with a
weaker developing nation, in which they negotiate and obtain treaty
terms that they cannot obtain in a multilateral forum such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or the WTO.9
These so-called TRIPS-plus agreements contain unconscionable terms
presented to weaker countries on a take it or we will take our ball (and
our markets) and go home basis.' 0 TRIPS-plus agreements do not
change the fundamental analysis in this Article that as one moves from
the 18th century codification of domestic intellectual property law, to the
late 19th century Berne and Paris Conventions, to the global
WTO-TRIPS regime, and to the more recent bilateral free-trade agree-
ments, a developing country's ability to use intellectual property without
the consent of a foreign rights holder has decreased. Consequently, the
problems identified in this Article with the current WTO-TRIPS regime
are aggravated with each successive post-WTO bilateral trade
agreement."
Arguably, unlicensed uses of intellectual property as a developmental
subsidy were implicitly recognized in the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which resulted in the creation
the benefits may plausibly have gone to persons who made no direct contribution to inno-
vation." Id. He attributes these direct and indirect effects to constitute over half of the
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Id.
9. See Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Fu-
ture, 1 WIPO J. 1, 6-7 (2009); PETER DRAHOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARD-SETrTING 18-19 (2002), available at http://
www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study-papers/sp8-drahosstudy.pdf. But see Jean-
Fr6ddric Morin, Multilateralising TRIPS-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure? 4,
19 (Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, Working Paper Oct. 1, 2008), available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.comlabstract=1276464 (questioning the effectiveness of these efforts in the patent
context).
10. See DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 17-21.
11. The problems are aggravated because each new trade agreement creates a higher
floor on which subsequent agreements are built, thus constituting a one way ratcheting of
intellectual property rights and obligations which are then codified into domestic law. See
id. at 21-22. In addition to the more transparent intellectual property negotiations in
WIPO and the WTO, there are other more secret plurinational attempts to tighten the
intellectual property regime. See, e.g., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT arts.
2.6-.7 (Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft Apr. 2010) [hereinafter ACTA], available
at http:ltrade.ec.europa.eu/doclibldocs12010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf (ACTA is an attempt
by key economic countries to establish a new anti-counterfeiting intellectual property en-
forcement norm).
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of the WTO and TRIPS.12 Uncompensated intellectual property trans-
fers to countries at an early stage of economic development promote eco-
nomic efficiency, further development goals, and constitute a type of
foreign aid subsidy. To a developing country, the economic effect is simi-
lar whether a developed country transfers $1 million in foreign aid,
purchases a $1 million intellectual property license for the benefit of the
developing country, or tacitly permits $1 million worth of unlicensed in-
tellectual property use in a developing country. 13
The first two examples, a transfer payment of $1 million or a purchase
of a $1 million intellectual property license, represent an expense borne
by the overburdened taxpayers of the developed country. Further, the
economic value of such payments is often confounded with accusations of
fraud, waste, and inefficiency. On the other hand, willful blindness or
tacit consent to the use of unlicensed intellectual property may promote
development goals more efficiently-often without any measurable cost.
The first two examples are top-down, may have significant transaction
costs, and are not necessarily responsive to market forces in the develop-
ing country. However, assuming that free markets are efficient in allocat-
ing intellectual property goods and services, developing countries will be
able, with minimum transaction costs, to appropriate the unlicensed intel-
lectual property that is most beneficial to their domestic economy; so, the
third example of tolerated, unlicensed uses may be the superior alterna-
tive to promote economic development.
Acquiescence to unlicensed intellectual property transfers ameliorates
most of these costs. If there is no expectation of robust enforcement of
the legal interests of foreign intellectual property rights holders, then the
domestic enforcement of intellectual property rights can be done at rela-
tively low costs. Naturally, the other costs imposed by intellectual prop-
erty protection will also decrease or be eliminated. Absent strong
domestic intellectual property enforcement, the developing country will
not pay higher prices for imported goods and technologies since these
goods and technologies could be produced locally or imported from an-
other developing country (one with a slightly higher level of industrializa-
12. See 1 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 19 (Kenneth A.
Reinert et al. eds., 2009). As a country moves from a least developed country, to a devel-
oping nation, and to newly industrialized country, domestic intellectual property protection
becomes increasingly important. See EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUB & STEPHANIE
DIEPEVEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 4 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2010/RAND
TR804.pdf.
13. As will be discussed later in this Article, $1 million worth of intellectual property
piracy at developed country market prices provides more than $1 million worth of benefits.
See infra Section IV. This Article will assume perfect information, rational economic ac-
tors, and any other factors necessary to support this theory while assuming away transac-
tion costs and variables (measurable or not) that will confound the preferred analysis. So
in this vein, the reader should suspend disbelief, "assume a can-opener," and let the author
proceed. See BENJAMIN J. COHEN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTELLEC-
TUAL HISTORY 41 (2008); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 716 F.
Supp. 543, 554 n.26 (D. Utah 1988) (the can-opener reference).
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tion) without paying an intellectual property premium. Industries in
developing countries that produce "pirated" products for their own mar-
ketplace, or for that of other developing countries, may continue or even
thrive in business by catering to the demands of other developing coun-
tries-thus expanding domestic manufacturing capability, increasing do-
mestic research and development capability, and promoting local
economic development and jobs. 14
In contrast, an effective domestic intellectual property rights enforce-
ment regime imposes significant actual and opportunity costs on a devel-
oping country without necessarily conveying any corresponding
benefits. 15 At the most obvious and measurable level are the administra-
tive costs of creating an intellectual property enforcement system, ad-
ministering the system, and then adjudicating claims that intellectual
property rights have been violated. 16 But there are also economic effects
and opportunity or development costs. There will be higher prices for
imported goods and increased fees for technology licenses. Slightly less
obvious will be the closure of imitative activities (so-called piracy). This
will result in a corresponding loss of economic activity through factory
closures, loss of employment, etc. Finally, legitimate domestic production
may be hindered by developed country rights holders' threats that misuse
intellectual property rights to discourage lawful but unlicensed uses of
intellectual property.17 Furthermore, there may be more productive uses
for the funds used to purchase intellectual property rights. For example,
developing countries could use these funds to promote education, in-
crease public health services, or create infrastructure.
At best, it is debatable whether developing countries, especially the
least developed countries (LDCs), received any benefit from the Faustian
bargain of trading enforceable domestic intellectual property rights for a
vague, unenforceable promise of technology transfer.18 Negotiating
under the threat of unilateral economic action by the United States under
§ 301 of the Trade Act (now called Special 301, previously called Super
301) and a reward of greater access to developed countries' markets dur-
14. See infra Part IV.D (discussing limitations on this proposed "right").
15. WILLIAM KINGSTON, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MATCHING INFORMA-
TION PROTECTION TO INNOVATION 171-72 (2010).
16. The World Bank estimated costs of TRIPS compliance to be at least $150 million
for a developing country. Charles W. Schmidt, Drugs as Intellectual Property, MODERN
DRUG DISCOVERY, June 2001, at 25-26, 28, available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/jour-
nals/mdd/v04/i06/html/06rules.html. This expenditure was made by some countries where
the annual public health expenditure is less that $100 per patient. Id. This could be thought
of as the costs of providing public health services to 1.5 million people in each of some of
the poorest countries in the world.
17. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
29 (2000).
18. See KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 78-79; COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 15
(2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/ciprfullfinal.pdf;
Sanjaya Lall & Manuel Albaladejo, Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs in Devel-
oping Countries, 5 (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, Working Paper No.
QEHWPS85, Apr. 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/qeh/qehwps/qehwps85.html.
[Vol. 64
Do as I Say (Not as I Did)
ing the Uruguay Round of GATF,19 developing countries agreed to enact
strong domestic protection of intellectual property rights in exchange for
developed countries' promotion of technology transfer and greater access
to developed country markets.20 In fact, if the WTO and TRIPS were
beneficial as rational economic actors, developing countries should have
embraced the WTO and TRIPS rather than being clubbed into submis-
sion at the bargaining table. However, it is clear that developed countries
received the benefits of this Hobbesian bargain because strong intellec-
tual property rights became the current legal and rhetorical norm. 21 If
these pre-WTO uncompensated transfers were considered a type of de-
velopmental subsidy, then as the global intellectual property rights re-
gime tightened, these then-legal (now illegal) leaks of technology transfer
should be replaced with some other subsidy-if only to restore the status
quo and to place developing countries in no worse a position post-WTO
than they enjoyed pre-WTO. 22 Unless coerced, it would be anomalous as
rational-profit-maximizing actors for the developing countries to volunta-
rily agree to TRIPS if they would be worse off under the TRIPS regime
than they were before entering into it.
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (2006); see DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 14 ("Breaking the resis-
tance of these 'hard liners' was fundamental to achieving the outcome that the US wanted.
Special 301 was swung into action in the beginning of 1989. When the USTR announced
the targets of Special 301, five of the ten developing countries that were members of the
hard line group in the GATT that were opposing the US agenda found themselves listed
for bilateral attention. Brazil and India, the two leaders, were placed in the more serious
category of Priority Watch List, while Argentina, Egypt and Yugoslavia were put on the
Watch List.").
20. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
66.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_ellegal-e/27-trips.pdf ("Developed country Members shall provide incentives to en-
terprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create
a sound and viable technological base."); TRIPS art. 7 ("The protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innova-
tion and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of pro-
ducers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."). For a prdcis of the back-
ground issues that led to the Uruguay Round and TRIPS as well as the negotiation posi-
tions of the developed and developing countries, see A.O. ADEDE, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS 3-10,
13-14, 15-22, 24 (2001), available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/1273.pdf.
21. See generally TRIPS arts. 1-73.
22. At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the U.S. government estimated that U.S.
intellectual property owners lost $50 billion because of global piracy. See J. Michael
Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 3 (Asian
Dev. Bank, ERD Working Paper No. 21, Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ppl.nl/
bibliographies/wto/files/1495.pdf. Most of this $50 billion in intellectual property value was
pirated in developing countries, so this $50 billion could also be understood as a $50 billion
annual foreign aid contribution. Unfortunately, actual U.S. foreign aid in 1990 totaled only
$16 billion. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
AID PROGRAMS: 1970 TO 2004 tbl. 1280 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/compen-
dia/statab/2007/tables/07s1280.xls. This level of piracy, if actually prevented, theoretically




This Article treats intellectual property as an organic whole and does
not engage in a more nuanced debate as to relative degrees of protection
for different forms of intellectual property in different sectors in the con-
text of development. 23 Each developing country has a different absorp-
tive or imitative capacity for using unlicensed technology, so this Article
is agnostic as to which forms of unlicensed intellectual property have the
greatest utility in developing countries. As recent scholarship demon-
strates, the key to German industrial growth in the 19th century, and its
ability to catch up with the United Kingdom, was not its robust patent
laws, but rather Germany's lack of strong copyright protection that re-
sulted in wide dissemination of scientific literature and practical instruc-
tion manuals. 24 So while it may appear that the use of patent protected
intellectual property is the key to development, the reality in some devel-
oping countries may be that cheap reproduction and dissemination of
copyrighted works is more significant to economic development than re-
producing patented innovation.25 Local market conditions will efficiently
determine the demand for unlicensed products.
Part II of this Article will use the United States as an example of a
developing-to-developed nation that passed through the infant piracy de-
velopment stage on its road to a mature economy. Part III will discuss
the birth of the modern intellectual property regime and how it increas-
ingly plugged legal leaks or loopholes that permitted uncompensated
transfers of intellectual property to developing economies. Part IV will
evaluate the relative efficiency of uncompensated or piratical transfers of
intellectual property or technology versus more traditional forms of de-
velopmental aid. Part V of this Article then concludes that uncompen-
sated uses may be a more efficient method of ensuring economic
development or technology transfer of intellectual property as long as
there are effective measures to keep the unlicensed products, made for
the developing country's economy, from being imported into a developed
nation's economy. 26
23. Because trademark laws are designed to protect consumers from deception, it is
hard for this author to posit an economic-development-based justification for a developing
country not to enforce trademark laws.
24. See Frank Thadeusz, No Copyright Law: The Real Reason for Germany's Industrial
Expansion?, DER SPIEGEL (Germany), Aug. 18, 2010, http:/www.spiegel.de/international/
zeitgeist/0,1518,710976,00.html.
25. See MAURICE BOISSIERE, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPART-
MENT, RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN PRIMARY EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK'S SUP-
PORT FOR PRIMARY EDUCATION 2-10 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/oed/
education/documents/education-primary-rationale-paper.pdf (discussing the role of edu-
cation in economic development).
26. In its analysis, this Article focuses solely on the utilitarian justification for intellec-
tual property rights in its analysis, and completely ignores in its analysis other common
justifications, such as those based on Hegel or Locke, because those are topics for another
article or another special law review volume and because the utilitarian justification is the
dominant philosophical justification for intellectual property. See Peter S. Menell, Intellec-
tual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 130
(2000), available at http://www.dklevine.org/archive/ittheory.pdf ("Not surprisingly, the
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II. THE TRADITION-UNCOMPENSATED TRANSFERS-NOW
KNOWN AS PIRACY
While it has not been conclusively proven that the piracy stage of eco-
nomic development is a necessary prerequisite to industrialization (devel-
opment), it is generally accepted that all of today's developed nations,
including the so-called newly industrialized nations passed through at
least one uncompensated transfer phase. 27 This section will discuss the
three stages that each successfully developed nation passed through on its
journey to economic development: the dissemination stage, the absorp-
tion stage, and the innovation stage that marks full economic develop-
ment. Then, this section will discuss a fourth stage, where excessive
intellectual property in developed countries begins to hinder knowledge-
based industries. This discussion will focus on proving this rule by using
the example of the United States, with tangential observations about the
experiences of other developed countries. Next, this section will address
whether Brazil, Russia, India, and China-the so-called BRIC coun-
tries-are the exceptions that prove the rule. A careful analysis of the
modern experience of BRIC countries shows that they are merely the
most recent example that uncompensated, unlicensed transfers are a criti-
cal ingredient to economic success. 28 This section concludes that free-
riding on the intellectual property of more developed nations by lesser
developed nations is quite common in the process of maturing into a de-
veloped economy.
A. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND PIRACY
Nations on the road to economic development spend a period of time
appropriating the intellectual property of more developed nations with-
out providing adequate (if any) compensation.29 Over time, developing
nations slowly develop a comprehensive intellectual property portfolio,
and in the fullness of time, they reach a stage where all forms of generally
recognized intellectual property (patent, trade secrets and know-how,
copyright, and trademarks) are zealously protected.30 Even those devel-
oping countries that do not have broad intellectual property portfolios
may have a substantial investment in one form of intellectual property.
So, in order to obtain international protection over those intellectual
principal philosophical theory applied to the protection of utilitarian works - that is, tech-
nological inventions - has been utilitarianism."); D.B. Resnik, A Pluralistic Account of In-
tellectual Property, 46 J. Bus. ETHICS 319, 324-25 (2003); cf ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S.
MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 2-8 (3d ed. 2003) (overview of various philosophies behind intellectual property).
27. See MASKUS, supra note 17, at 15-16.
28. See Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons
from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
400, 403-11 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v5/n3/1.
29. HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at xv.
30. See OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 66 (Michael B. Wal-
lerstein et al. eds., 1993).
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property assets, they are prepared to grant expansive protection to other
forms of intellectual property. This section will briefly discuss four puta-
tive stages of development and intellectual property.
The capacity of [developing] countries to copy advanced technolo-
gies is in fact very weak, but is subjectively over-estimated. People
... may think that all that is stopping them is western-owned intel-
lectual property. In fact, successful imitation requires much more in
terms of human and social capital than simply freedom to imitate. 31
In stage one, arguably the earliest stage or lowest level of economic
development, foreign direct investment is rare and usually limited to spe-
cialized sectors-often relating to the exploitation of natural resources or
developing franchise service industries like a major international brand
bottling company. 32 At this stage, foreign direct investment is critical.
Often, developing countries at this stage of development have only natu-
ral resources or unskilled, cheap labor to offer foreign direct investors. 33
Foreign businesses must create the necessary infrastructure and establish
a solid foundation on which to build the eventual capacity to absorb tech-
nology. 34 Most critical at this stage is investment in human capital. De-
veloping countries must invest in the training of skilled workers and
junior managers so that they eventually have the skills to develop an in-
dependent, productive workforce. 35 Successfully developing a skilled
workforce is a prerequisite to entering stage two.
In stage two, the developing nation's economy is now able to absorb
technology, to imitate technology at some level, and to contribute minor
improvements to the transferred technology or intellectual property used
in the domestic economy.36 Absorptive capacity is "the ability to iden-
tify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment. ' 37 There
are two methods of measuring absorptive capacity.38 Some scholars use
"investment in R&D, provision of formal training and workforce educa-
tion" while others use "the total factor productivity gap" method to mea-
sure absorptive capacity.3 9 Critical to the absorptive stage is human
31. See William Kingston, Removing Some Harm from the World Trade Organization,
32 OXFORD DEV. STUDIES 309, 319 (2004), available at http://www.tara.tcd.ie/bitstream/
2262/8696/1/Removing%20some%20harm.pdf.
32. See JOHN H. DUNNING & RAJNEESH NARULA, MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL
COMPETITIVENESS: A NEW AGENDA 45, 48-50 (2004). This Article uses a simplified ver-
sion of the model of industrial development and foreign direct investment and is derived
from the Dunning/Narula model.
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 45, 49.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Richard Kneller et al., Does Absorptive Capacity Affect who Benefits from Inter-
national Technology Transfer? 8 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.etsg.org/ETSG2010/papers/Pantea.pdf (emphasis removed) (quoting Wesley M. Co-
hen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R & D, 99 EcON.
J. 569, 569 (Sept. 1989)).
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id.
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capital. A well-educated workforce is more readily adapted to absorb
new technology and incorporate it into the domestic economy than a less
well-educated workforce. 40 Some studies demonstrate that a 1% increase
in the average level of human capital results in up to 17% growth of the
GDP over a generation.4 1 While human capital is critical at all levels of
development, it plays different roles at different levels of development.
At the absorptive phase, human capital permits the developing country to
use new technology while at the innovative newly industrialized stage, it
facilitates innovation in the economy. 42 Research and development are
also significant economic factors, but at this stage, domestic research ef-
forts are primarily facilitative or associated with technology transfer.43
As a developing country moves towards the more developed-nation
stage, it gradually focuses its research and development efforts on more
innovative projects. 44
In stage three, the developing nation is now newly industrialized and is
producing its own intellectual property.4 5 Innovation-friendly countries
tend to be more industrialized, or at least have a higher material standard
of living, than countries that are less friendly towards innovation.4 6 Dur-
ing this stage, developing nations are very selective as to which intellec-
tual property rights they zealously protect and which rights they
encourage misappropriation of.4 7 As developing countries create intel-
lectual property, the amount of intellectual property to zealously protect
continually grows-until these countries reach a tipping point and intel-
lectual property protection becomes the new dominant mantra.4 8 This is
the tipping point where a country moves from developing or newly indus-
trialized to a mature, developed economy and assumes its role as a "ma-
ture" or "responsible" player in the global intellectual property regime.
In stage four, the now fully developed, industrialized country has a ro-
bust, innovative economy built on strong intellectual property rights. In
the fourth stage, post-industrial economy nations may need a rebalancing
of intellectual property rights in light of first principles. 49 The stage four
developed, post-industrial-revolution nation's further economic develop-
ment may need to be characterized by an incremental increase in fair uses
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Dunning & Narula, supra note 32, at 45.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Bruce Einhorn, The World's Most Innovative Countries: The 30 Most Innova-
tive-Friendly Countries, Bus. WEEK, http://images.businessweek.com/ss/09103/0312-
innovative countries/1.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
47. Cf CHRISTOPH ANTONS, Harmonization and Selective Adaptation as Intellectual
Property Policies in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HARMONISATION WITHIN ASEAN
AND APEC 109-118, 121 (Christopher Antons et al. eds., 2004) (Discussing selective adap-
tation of IP laws in ASEAN and APEC countries).
48. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 2002, 130-132 (2001).
49. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 27-29 (2002).
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and not by fared-use (or fear-to-use use).50 Surprisingly, especially as the
economy moves from an industrial economy to an information economy,
there may be a change in the marginal utility of additional increases in
intellectual property law protection. 5'
So far in the knowledge-based economies, the dominant engine of eco-
nomic change is the Internet, which was developed by adding value
through fair use and the absence of intellectual property rights protecting
its core infrastructure.52 The new dominant industries in this economy
may be characterized by companies like Google, Inc., whose business
model thrives on copyright fair use by finding new uses of copyrighted
content that add value to both the consumer and the copyright owner.53
An excessively developed body of intellectual property rights may result
in the development of legal barriers or anti-commons that hinders inno-
vation and the creation of new works. Over-patenting and bad patents
may result in an anti-common of patent thickets, which may hinder rather
than promote innovation. 54 Intellectual property owners increasingly
strive to control all possible uses through technology, law, licensing, or
threats of litigation.5 5 This includes attempts to control productive, non-
competitive uses in developing countries. Moreover, established indus-
tries use their intellectual property rights to hinder competitive nonintel-
lectual property changes in the marketplace and other forms of rent-
seeking.56 As all innovation and creativity builds on the work of others,
these new upstart technologies are labeled as parasitic or piratical, and
they unnecessarily face robust legal challenges. In this final stage, the
truly creative and innovative activities that should be encouraged are
threatened by an excess of intellectual property protection.
50. Cf Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Re-
flections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515,
526 n.42 (2010) ("[flair use dependent industries grew at a faster pace than the overall
economy, were more productive, and were responsible for an estimated [$]194 billion in
exports in 2006" (alterations in original) (quoting another source)); Martin Senftleben,
Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law-the Need for Hori-
zontal Fair Use Defences 30 (VU University Amsterdam, Working Paper, Apr. 16, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=159713.
51. See EVA HEMMUNGS WIRT8N, TERMS OF USE: NEGOTIATING THE JUNGLE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL COMMONS 136-37 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Markus Muller, Who Owns The Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis for
American Control of the Internet, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 709,
728-31, 744 (2005) (noting that "nobody has ever filed patent applications for TCP/IP or
the DNS").
53. See Geiger, supra note 50, at 526.
54. See generally Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60
STAN. L. REV. 863, 863-67 (2007); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576-80 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance,
Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking The Anticommons In Biomedical Research, 45
Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1060-63 (2008).
55. See Mark A. Lemley, Property Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 73 STAN.
LAW. 34, 34-35 (2005), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/stanford-
lawyer/issues/73/s173_Property.pdf.
56. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 1-42 (2009).
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B. IT MATTERS WHOSE Ox Is BEING GORED-NEW STRIDENT
VOICES DEFENDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
At a certain point in national economic development, developing coun-
tries become developed. At this point, they realize that they are net ex-
porters of intellectual property and that their economies are being built
on strong intellectual property rights. 57 As one commentator observed:
In less advanced economies, technology absorption can drive eco-
nomic growth because countries at the forefront of technology act as
a driver for growth by expanding the stock of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge, pulling other countries through a 'catch-up' ef-
fect. However, the strength of this 'catch-up' effect at the technology
frontier decreases with the level of technological development, to the
benefit of technology creation. Indeed, technology creation by do-
mestic firms becomes progressively more important as a country
moves closer to the technology frontier, because catching up with the
frontier translates into increasingly smaller technological
improvement. 58
To put it more bluntly, countries protect intellectual property when
they are more likely to be the victims of intellectual property theft rather
than the thieves or beneficiaries of the violation of intellectual property
rights. Two recent examples of developing-to-developed countries are
South Korea and Singapore, both of which now have significant, valuable
intellectual property assets to protect.5 9 Years ago, Singapore and South
Korea were well-known for their production and trade in questionable,
pirated goods. 60 Today, they are well-known for their legitimate indus-
tries and the quality of their exports. 61 It seems that, as a natural part of
economic development, countries reach a point where, in their own self-
interest, they begin to demand strong intellectual property rights protec-
tion.62 Local innovative industries will demand strong intellectual prop-
erty protection-for use as a sword to protect their own innovation
against domestic pirates unfairly competing against them the
57. See generally HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002); KINGSTON, supra note 15.
58. HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at xv.
59. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COM. COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP., MAKING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WORK FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3-4 (2005) (policy statement), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/intellectual-property/Statements/Making
IPworkfordevelopingcountriesl9July05.pdf ("Korea is now the fourth largest producer[ ] of
industrial property rights in the world and has seen a notable increase in domestic patent
applications (51.3% in 1992 to 75.6% in 2004) and trademark applications (73.5% in 1992
to 84.8% in 2004) .... Licensing revenue from patents and new technologies developed in
Singapore increased from Sing$55.17 million to Sing$132.37 million between 2001-2003,
and Singapore is currently Asia's top location for legal CD and DVD content
replication.").
60. See MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 58 (2004).
61. See DAVID DRAKAKIS-SMITH, PACIFIC ASIA 142-46 (1992).
62. See WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 130-32; Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property




Imagine a small, local adhesive strip manufacturer. It must pay for its
own research and development and brand development and thus, it can-
not compete in terms of price in the marketplace with counterfeit adhe-
sive strips bearing internationally-known brand labels. If the local
company is to succeed, it will have to drive the pirates out of the market-
place. Local innovative companies will also use intellectual property
rights as a shield against the claims of foreign intellectual property rights
holders and to prevent foreign competitors from appropriating locally-
developed innovation. Consequently, over time, as countries move from
least developed to newly industrialized, they will move from intellectual
property scofflaws to reputable members of the intellectual property
community. As a result, the quantity or quality of the uncompensated
intellectual property technology transfers will decrease, and as these
countries develop a vibrant middle class, they will be converted into new
markets for developed countries and become nations that promote inno-
vation and creativity through the enforcement of strong intellectual prop-
erty laws.
C. THE UNITED STATES AS A MODEL OF A DEVELOPED ECONOMY
The title of this Article, "Do As I Say (Not As I Did)," comes from the
historical experience of the United States as it transitioned from an agri-
cultural, developing nation into a fully-developed, mature industrial
economy and the subsequent post-industrial revolution phase of develop-
ment, where the creation of information and services rather than the pro-
duction of goods drives the economy.64 As the United States' economy
evolved, its relationship to intellectual property, especially the protection
of the intellectual property of others nations, also changed to reflect na-
tional interests. The United States is not alone in that it constantly ad-
justed its level of intellectual property protection to achieve its
developmental goals.65 One could make similar observations about a
practical, rather than principled, approach to intellectual property rights
by examining the economic histories of some member states of the Euro-
pean Union.66 Similar arguments could also be made drawing on the
more recent intellectual property policies of countries such as Japan, Ko-
rea, and China.67 However, this section will use the United States as the
paradigm to prove the claim that intellectual property piracy (or at least
uncompensated use) is a well-trodden road to economic development.
These piratical activities were not undertaken solely by private parties for
63. DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE
TRIPs AGREEMENT 110-11 (2001).
64. Cf Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An
Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 460--61 (2001).
65. See KINGSTON, supra note 15.
66. See id.
67. See MASKUS, supra note 17, at 92 (discussing development experiences in Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and China).
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their own personal enrichment but also as part of an official governmen-
tal policy to promote technology transfer.68
The United States enacted its first patent law in 1790 that restricted
patent protection exclusively to original inventors. The 1790 Patent Act
also provided that prior use anywhere automatically invalidated the pat-
ent.6 9 Alas, this principled commitment to absolute patent novelty had
little to do with reality. "Smuggling technology from Europe and claim-
ing the privileges of invention was quite common and most of the politi-
cal and intellectual elite of the revolutionary and early national
generation were directly or indirectly involved in technology piracy....
Americans had welcomed such practices since the early days of European
colonization." 70
The post-American Revolution rhetoric was devoid of any
"[a]mbivalence about the morality of appropriating the fruits of the intel-
lectual efforts of foreigners," and the refrain was "the new republic's
right to 'borrow of Europe their inventions.'"71 The United States also
enacted internal structural barriers for non-U.S. citizens seeking the pro-
tection of U.S. law. For example, in the early days of the republic, the
patent filing fee for a U.S. citizen was $30, for a subject of Great Britain it
was $500, and for other non-U.S. citizens it was $300.72 American patent
law "sanctioned technology piracy as long as imported technology was
not restricted exclusively to any particular individual introducer. '" 7 3
When asked for his approval for an act of piracy, President Washington
declined because of the "dignity of the United States" rather than the
immorality of the act.74 He then encouraged the Governor of Virginia to
proceed with the project and offered all possible assistance consistent
with the dignity of the United States.7 5 While these transfers may not
have violated international norms, they did violate the laws of the coun-
try from which the technology transfer or intellectual property flowed.
Had the same transfer taken place in the United States-for example,
between citizens of different states rather than different countries-it
would have been illegal. 76
68. DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 145 (2004) (discussing then-Secretary of the Treasury
Alexander Hamilton's analysis of U.S. industries and his "call for an aggressive policy of
technology piracy").
69. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790) (repealed 1793).
70. BEN-ATAR, supra note 68, at xv; see also id at 169.
71. Id. at 86.
72. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES
AND THEIR CLIENTS 102 (2010). A rough conversion $30 in 1790 is worth $715 in 2010 and
$500 is worth $11,900 in 2010. See Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the
Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount-1774 to Present, MEASURING WORTH (March
2011), www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (using the GDP deflator index).
73. BEN-ATAR, supra note 68, at 169-70.
74. Id. at 171-72.
75. Id. at 172-73.
76. Cf ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 2:03(A)-(B) (2008) (dis-
cussing colonial era patent acts); WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 Patry on Copyright § 1:17 (2010)
(discussing state copyright protection in the 18th century).
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These anti-foreign intellectual property rights policies continued into
the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. The United States continued to adopt
and adapt its intellectual property laws to maximize its economic and de-
velopmental advantages vis-A-vis other developed and developing econo-
mies.77 The United States protected non-U.S. patents, trademarks, and
other forms of industrial property early on because the United States was
a leader in technology innovation in the 19th century. 78 Four years after
the drafting of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, the Paris Convention entered into force in the United States. 79 In
contrast, perhaps still stinging from Sydney Smith's jibe that "[iun the four
quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an Amer-
ican play? or looks at an American picture or statue?[,]" 80 the United
States did not partake in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Lit-
erary and Artistic Works until 1988.81 Even today, some prominent com-
mentators contend that because of its lack of (or extremely weak) moral-
rights protections, the United States is still not completely in conformity
with its obligations under the Berne Convention.82 Still others may ques-
tion its adherence to the Paris Convention and TRIPS.83
77. See KINGSTON, supra note 15; see also Vivian Mufioz Tellez, The Changing Global
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement: A New Challenge for Developing Coun-
tries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 4-5
(Xuan Li & Carlos Maria Correa eds., 2009).
78. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPY-
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 298-301 (2005).
79. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., About WIPO: Treaties and Contracting Parties,
WIPO.INT, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search-what=C (select "United
States of America" as the Contracting Party, "Paris Convention" as the Treaty, and click
"Search") (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (listing the Paris Convention as entering into force in
the U.S. on May 30, 1887).
80. Sydney Smith, Book Review, 33 EDINBURGH REV. 69, 79-80 (1820) (reviewing
ADAM SEYBERT, STATISTICAL ANNALS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1818)) ("In
the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an American
play? or looks at an American picture or statue? What does the world yet owe to Ameri-
can physicians or surgeons? What new substances have their chemists discovered? or what
old ones have they analyzed? What new constellations have been discovered by the
telescopes of Americans?-what have they done in the mathematics? Who drinks out of
American glasses? or eats from American plates? or wears American coats or gowns? or
sleeps in American blankets?-Finally, under which of the old tyrannical governments of
Europe is every sixth man a Slave, whom his fellow-creatures may buy and sell and tor-
ture?"). This sounds like a clarion call for strong, high-barrier intellectual property protec-
tion accompanied by significant investment in pure science research as well as commercial
research and development.
81. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988).
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, 5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 16:3 (2010); Graeme W.
Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 111, 116-18 (2005). See generally, H.R. REP. No. 101-514
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915 (legislative history of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990).
83. As a member of the Paris Convention, the Madrid Union, the TRIPS Agreement,
and NAFTA, the United States is obligated to protect well-known marks. See Andrew
Cook, Comment, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: A Study of the Well-Known Marks Doc-
trine in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 416-18 (2009). Yet,
there is a difference of opinion among U.S. courts of appeals as to whether the laws of the
United States protect well-known marks. Id. at 417-18. Compare Grupo Gigante SA De
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At first, the United States excluded foreign-authored works from U.S.
copyright protection. Later, it required that works by foreign authors
seeking U.S. copyright protection be simultaneously published in the
United States.84 Simultaneous publication benefited the United States
because if the United States had to protect foreign authors then at the
very least, foreign copyright owners should pay for this protection by pro-
moting the domestic production, manufacture, and printing of copy-
righted works. 85 The United States' copyright law had numerous
formalities (traps) that made protection of works in the United States
problematic for foreign authors accustomed to the formality-free copy-
right regime of the Berne Convention. 86 The copyright laws and policies
of the United States ensured that long after the Industrial Revolution and
after the United States achieved its status as a developed, industrialized
country, school children, researchers, and others in the United States
could enjoy the fruits of the intellectual labors of the citizens of the Brit-
ish Empire without paying a copyright royalty.8 7 While the subject of this
CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the well-known
marks doctrine applies), with ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163 (2d Cir. 2007)
("We do not ourselves discern in the plain language of sections 44(b) and (h) a clear con-
gressional intent to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal unfair competition
law.").
84. International Copyright Act, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891); Harper & Bros. v. M.A.
Donohue & Co., 144 F.,491, 492-93 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905).
85. See International Copyright Act, supra note 84, at § 4956; 17 U.S.C. § 15 (1909).
In 1876, the United States was importing $940,000 worth of books from the United King-
dom while exporting only $93,000. Marjorie McCannon, The Manufacturing Clause of the
U.S. Copyright Law, reprinted in 2 STUD. ON COPYRIGHT 1123, 1128 (Arthur Fisher Memo-
rial ed. 1963). There was a 25% tariff on printed books. Id. at 1129. There were several
purported justifications for this policy. Congress was concerned that lower priced foreign
books might flood the United States with "alien philosophies, politics, and religion." Id.
U.S. authors desired to keep pirated editions of their own works from seeping into the
United States, and there was a general desire to protect the U.S. printing industry from
foreign competition. Id. at 1129. Over time, as domestic manufacture of books increased,
the relative significance of imports decreased, and the U.S. print industries entered the fray
with low-priced paperback books, and the U.S. granted greater protection to foreign En-
glish language works. Id. at 1176-77, 1183-84. By the mid-1950s, the U.S. publishing in-
dustries were sufficiently established, so the United States ultimately eliminated the
domestic manufacture requirements when the United States became a signatory to the
Universal Copyright Convention. See Universal Copyright Convention art. 2, Sept. 6,
1952, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=15381&URLDO=DO-
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
86. See Eric Schuler, Why Not International Copyright? A Consideration of the Rea-
sons for America's Conspicuous Absence from the International Copyright Union, Au-
THORS' LEAGUE BULL., Jan. 1919, at 6.
87. Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-Century British and American Copyright Law,
THE VICTORIAN WEB, http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/pva/pva74.html (last
modified Jan. 5, 2001) ("Thus, although the Berne Convention greatly simplified the copy-
right process among European nations, numerous unauthorized American re-prints contin-
ued to appear until 1891, when the United States finally agreed to discontinue sanctioning
literary piracy."). The 1891 Chace Act has been severely criticized as ineffective. The 1891
Chace Act "had enough loopholes, one scholar has noted, to 'make the extension of copy-
right protection to foreigners illusory."' JOE KARAGANIS, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES 409 (2011). Of course, the saga continues. For example, the Sonny Bono Fair-
ness in Music Licensing Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), is arguably a transfer or subsidy by Euro-
pean and foreign musical artists to the U.S. restaurant, entertainment, and other industries
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(im)morality tale is the United States, a similar section could have been
written about other developed countries.88
D. BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA (BRIC) COUNTRIES AS A Sui
Generis Model of Development
The BRIC countries may be used as an exemplar to test the rule that
piracy is one stage on the road to economic development, but not the
principle that the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement have barred this his-
toric route to development. BRIC countries are outside the trade-intel-
lectual property subsidy paradigm discussed in this Article for several
reasons. First, they are pre-WTO, newly-industrialized countries rather
than developing countries. The BRIC countries have moved beyond the
diffusion phase and are at the absorptive or innovative phase of economic
development. 89 The absorptive phase is the point of development where
intellectual property protection becomes critical to continued foreign di-
rect investment.90 At this point, there is an increased reliance on domes-
tic production of new knowledge as a tool of development.
Second, while their economies continue on the road to developed-na-
tion status, the BRIC countries became newly industrialized nations dur-
ing the pre-WTO era.91 Both China and Russia had a significant
industrial base prior to entry into the capitalist marketplace. 92 Until re-
that publicly perform the copyrighted music of foreign artists without paying a licensing
fee. See generally Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/
DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/1234da.
pdf. Despite the WTO panel ruling, the U.S. remains an international scofflaw-the
United States sporadically pays the European Union an appropriate sum and continues to
permit domestic U.S. businesses to use foreign authored musical works in derogation of
U.S. treaty obligations under TRIPS and Berne. See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 May 2010, WT/DSB/M283 (July 23,
2010), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsbminutes/m283.pdf.
88. See, e.g., CHANG, supra note 57, at 2, 57; Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 49, at
27-28; Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Post Canctin WTO TRIPs-A Bumpy Road, in AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DOHA ROAD 388 n.4 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.springerlink.com/content/v36227208wr55v70/fulltext.pdf ("interesting
Dutch example with the Netherlands suspending patent law protection from 1869 until
1910"). Austria required foreign inventions to be made in Austria. DRAHOS &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 49, at 34; ROD FALVEY & NEIL FOSTER, THE ROLE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE-
ORY AND EVIDENCE 49 (2006), available at http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/60030-
05_IPR-rights in-technology-transfer.pdf ("Both anecdotal evidence and the case study
evidence reviewed above, indicates that many current innovators operated lax IPR systems
in the past, designed to encourage technology diffusion through imitation, as well as incre-
mental innovation through utility models.").
89. See generally INT'L CHAMBER OF COM. COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 59.
90. HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at xv ("The empirical literature
also shows that stronger IPRs can encourage domestic innovation, at least in emerging
industrialised economies."); see also id. at 6.
91. See generally JIM O'NEILL, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No. 66:
BUILDING BETrER GLOBAL ECONOMIC BRICs (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/building-better.html.
92. A. AKOPIAN, INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL OF RUSSIA: ANALYTICAL STUDY BASED ON
FIXED ASSETS, STATISTICS TO 1992, at 41-43 (1992); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN
TRADE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, 1978-1990, at 33-36 (1992).
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cently the developmental goals of Brazil and India were to be self-suffi-
cient and to develop local capacity to meet all their internal needs.93 The
BRIC countries were already on a trajectory to development. Recent
events and better domestic policies merely increased the rate at which
they are achieving their developmental goals.
Third, the BRIC countries are sui generis. They are geographically
large, control significant natural resources, have large populations, play a
unique strategic geopolitical role in their respective spheres of interest,
and three of the four are members of the world's most exclusive club:
countries with nuclear weapons. 94 Russia and China are also permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council, giving them the power
to veto any action by the U.N. Security Council. 95 Therefore, trade and
intellectual property relationships with these countries are confounded
with other factors, such as geopolitical considerations, rather than pure
considerations of intellectual property enforcement and proper trade
practices. 96 Because of the BRIC countries' size, relative wealth, and
strategic considerations (including those related to trade as well as to na-
tional security concerns) developed countries are loath to use the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism or the other leavers of soft power, such as
foreign aid.97 Other forms of political and economic pressure are also
less effective when attempting to coerce a BRIC country to comply with
international intellectual property norms in their domestic or interna-
tional trade practices. 98 Accordingly, in the BRIC countries the modern
intellectual property and trade regime is more a precatory obligation with
the potential for soft sanctions for violating the rules rather than an obli-
gation enforced under the WTO dispute settlement system or through
coercive foreign policy measures. Thus, the BRIC countries currently en-
joy development status and access to uncompensated intellectual prop-
erty transfers that is akin to that historically enjoyed by all countries pre-
WTO.
93. S. MUKHERJEE & J. CHAKRABARTI, EVOLUTION OF INDIAN ECONOMY & ELEMEN-
TARY STATISTICS 252-256 (2000).
94. RADHA RAJ, ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
AGEMENT 2.15-2.16, tbls. 2.1-.2; List of States with Nuclear Weapons, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List of stateswithnuclearweapons (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
95. Membership of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS (last visited May 11, 2011),
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp.
96. The Trillion-Dollar Club: Brazil, Russia, India and China Matter Individually. But
Does It Make Sense to Treat the BRICs-Or any Other Combination of Emerging Pow-
ers-As a Block?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
15912964.
97. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31066, HIV/AIDS
DRUGS, PATENTS AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 13-15 (2001)
(describing how the U.S. disengaged with Brazil before the WTO over a disputed compul-
sory license for U.S. AIDS drugs).
98. Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43
AM. Bus. L.J. 317, 334-49 (2006).
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III. BIRTH OF THE MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME
The global intellectual property regime that was ultimately enshrined
into TRIPS was largely finalized in the 19th century.99 The 19th century
saw the closing of the intellectual property frontier. 00 Patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks were clearly protected in domestic law and ulti-
mately defined in international treaties. 10 1 Many of the countries that are
now characterized as developing nations did not participate in negotiating
the 19th century treaties that ultimately became the basis of the current
global intellectual property regime.'02 Despite the participation of some
developing countries, the 19th century intellectual property rights treaties
were largely Eurocentric, with occasional participation by the United
States. And to the degree that the needs of many of the countries that
are now part of the developing world were considered, their participation
was as colonies or dependencies of the European powers.'0 3
The needs and role of the colonies, if and when considered, were con-
sidered as part of the historical legacy of mercantilism. 10 4 Under mercan-
tilism, the role of the colonies was to provide raw materials and to be a
99. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 2 (requiring compliance with Articles 1
through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention); id. art. 9 (allowing the same excep-
tions as the Paris Convention and Berne Convention); id. art. 9.1 (requiring compliance
with the substantive provisions of Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention and its
annex).
100. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 3 (1999) (contending the
modern paradigm, taxonomy, and distinctions among patent, copyright, and trademark
laws can be trace to the 1850s). The "newer," more developing-world "friendly" forms of
intellectual property are not generally recognized, nor part of the 19th-century
WTO-TRIPS intellectual property bargain. See generally Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, June 5, 1992, available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/ (bio-piracy); UNESCO,
Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00006; UNESCO World Heritage Con-
vention, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage, Nov. 16 1972, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext.
101. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
1, Sept. 9, 1886 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ip/berne/trtdocswo001.html (copyright). Of course, these treaties were revised and
amended numerous times over the years; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1883 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at http://www.wipo.
int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo02O.html ("patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and
the repression of unfair competition").
102. See KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 67; see, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 101,
art. 26 ("[c]ontracting countries shall have the right to accede to the present convention at
any time for their colonies or foreign possessions"); Paris Convention, supra note 101, art.
24.1 ("Any country may... any time thereafter, that this Convention shall be applicable to
all or part of those territories, designated in the declaration or notification, for the external
relations of which it is responsible.").
103. Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Stan-
dard-Setting, COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/
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marketplace for manufactured goods. 10 5 Under an economic policy of
neo-mercantilism, the role of intellectual property or technology transfer
to the then-colonies (now developing nations) as an engine of economic
development was marginalized or rejected by the European powers for
fear of creating competitors. 10 6 This legacy continued in former colonies
even after their political independence. 10 7 As colonies became indepen-
dent, the colonial power's intellectual property laws were often retained
as the laws of the newly-independent country with little, if any, considera-
tion as to whether these laws were appropriate for the unique economic-
development challenges facing each newly-independent country. 10 8
While the dominant body of intellectual property law was developed in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, these intellectual property treaty
regimes lacked an effective enforcement mechanism. 10 9 Nations that had
the infrastructure or the human and fiscal capital to move from agricul-
tural economies to industrial economies continued to enjoy an unsanc-
tioned respite from domestic intellectual property enforcement
obligations." 0 Thus, as a developmental tool, uncompensated transfers
were still available. As one historian observed,
Without an international intellectual property regime, abiding by
these notions was left to the voluntary actions of states. The United
States merely paid lip service to the principle of international intel-
105. ELIZABETH C. HANSON, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS
142 (2008).
106. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 57, at 23 ("Britain banned the imports of superior
products from some of its colonies if they happened to threaten British industries."). But
see JOHNS, supra note 3, at 263 (describing sui generis counter examples. For example, in
1852, the United Kingdom excluded colonies of the British Empire from having to honor
patents filed in the home country, but this policy was to compensate sugar plantations and
manufacturers for the additional labor and equipment costs after the abolition of slavery.).
107. See DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 8.
108. Id. at 8-9 ("By the time many countries shed their colonial status, they were con-
fronted by a Berne system that was run by an Old World club of former colonial powers to
suit their economic interests. Former colonial powers continued to watch over their former
colonies. When eleven Sub-Saharan states joined Berne they were 'so totally dependent
economically and culturally upon France (and Belgium) and so inexperienced in copyright
matters that their adherence was, in effect, politically dictated by the 'mother country'
during the aftermath of reaching independence."') (quoting A.H. Lazar, Developing Coun-
tries and Author's Rights in International Copyright, in 19 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM
(1971)). Moreover, the Secretariats of the Conventions were funded by each country ac-
cording to their wealth so that the staff was largely drawn from the countries with the
greatest interests in protecting intellectual property. At least one author speculates based
on information released through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that "the
Secretariate act[s] to preserve structures which reflect the interests of the more powerful
countries." KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 104.
109. See Berne Convention, supra note 101, art. 33 ("(1) Any dispute ... may . .. be
brought before the International Court of Justice ... unless the countries concerned agree
on some other method of settlement. .... (2) Each country may ... declare that it does not
consider itself bound by the provisions of paragraph (1). With regard to any dispute be-
tween such country and any other country of the Union, the provisions of paragraph (1)
shall not apply."); Paris Convention, supra note 101, art. 28(1) ("Any dispute between two
or more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or application of this Con-
vention ... may ... be brought before the International Court of Justice ... unless the
countries concerned agree on some other method of settlement.").
110. KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 66.
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lectual property. Ignoring intellectual property entitlements across
national lines enabled Americans to build an industrial powerhouse
founded upon the intellectual labor of Europeans.1"'
The experience of other nations supports this conclusion. A German eco-
nomic historian, Eckhard Hoffner, concluded that Germany's lack of cop-
yright law was at the foundation of Germany's industrial development in
the 19th century. 112 In order to protect its domestic industries from for-
eign competition, Germany did not join the Paris Convention until 1903,
twenty years after the Convention was first opened to signatories.11 3
The ability of countries to ignore either the intellectual property rights
of foreigners or to interpret flexibly their treaty obligations changed with
the creation of the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement. 114 For the first
time, international intellectual property treaties provided a carrot by of-
fering tariff concessions to encourage countries to adopt a minimum level
of domestic intellectual property protection and a stick through the WTO
dispute resolution mechanisms to encourage effective intellectual prop-
erty rights enforcement at the national level.1 15
The creation of the WTO required that developed countries make cer-
tain vacuous commitments that are integrally related to intellectual prop-
erty, primarily in the area of technology transfer. 1 6 The quid pro quo for
developing nations entering into the WTO, especially the TRIPS Agree-
ment, was the largely unfulfilled promise by the developed countries to
promote technology transfer to developing countries.1 17 Technology
transfer provides numerous benefits: "[provides] more and better compe-
tition, upgrade[s] domestic innovative capacity, increase[s] R&D employ-
ment, give[s] better training and support[s] to education, and reverse[s]
'brain drain' effects."118 Generally, while the WTO and the TRIPS
111. BEN-ATAR, supra note 68. England adopted patent policies to reward foreigners
to bring technology to England thus converting it "from a technological debtor nation into
one of the world's center of industry and innovation." Id. at 9.
112. See Frank Thadeusz, No Copyright Law: The Real Reason for Germany's Industrial
Expansion?, DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 18, 2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
zeitgeist/0,1518,710976,00.html.
113. See KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 67.
114. See WTO-TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 69
(Peter-Tobias Stoll, Jan Busche & Katrin Arend eds., 2009); Kevin Kennedy, The 2005
TRIPS Extension for the Least-Developed Countries: A Failure of the Single Undertaking
Approach?, 40 INT'L LAW. 683, 697-99 (2006) ("Article XI:2 of the Agreement Establish-
ing the WTO is not an escape hatch designed to relieve LDCs permanently of their WTO
legal obligations. But if that article is indeed a general exception for LDCs from the single
undertaking approach, then perhaps a decision should be taken by the WTO Ministerial
Conference permanently to exempt LDCs from assuming any obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement and instead to make adoption of the Agreement optional for them.").
115. Christine Thelen, Comment, Carrots And Sticks: Evaluating the Tools for Securing
Successful TRIPs Implementation, 24 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 519, 520-24 (2005).
116. See TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 66(2).
117. See id.; Kennedy, supra note 114, at 686.
118. HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at 3. This is also not to say that
TRIPS and the WTO do not contain certain flexibilities that ameliorate some of their more
draconian positions. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 27(2), 27(3), 31, 40. See also
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
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Agreement promoted increased intellectual property protection, the
WTO and developed nations failed to deliver on their promises of in-
creased technology transfer.1 19
While foreign direct investment and the export trade are significant
factors in economic development and improving the material well-being
in developing countries,12 0 the conclusions of the academic and non-gov-
ernmental organization studies on whether the WTO, TRIPS, and domes-
tic-strong intellectual property rights law are good for the economic
development of developing countries is, to be charitable, at best mixed.
12 1
The empirical evidence suggests that stronger [intellectual property
rights] may positively affect the volume of [foreign direct invest-
ment] and exports, particularly in countries with strong technical ab-
sorptive capabilities where the risk of imitation is high. When such
risk is weak, particularly in the poorest countries, firms in developed
countries do not seem to be sensitive to the level of protection in
developing countries. 122
Strong intellectual property rights do not necessarily encourage foreign
direct investment. Rather, under some circumstances, stronger intellec-
tual property rights may actually decrease foreign direct investment.
123
For example, if intellectual property protection is weak, foreign investors
prefer foreign direct investment so that they can control the dissemina-
tion and use of their intellectual property assets.1 24 However, if intellec-
tual property rights are strong, then a foreign direct investor may be
willing to risk their intellectual property assets and use a local licensee
rather than directly engage in the market. 2 5
U.N.T.S. 154, 162 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (Article XI:2 provides "[t]he least-
developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to
undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual de-
velopment, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities.
This Article contends that the global Realpolitik makes exercising these rights under
TRIPS or the WTO problematic at best, and at worse, it threatens a developing country
with unilateral sanctions and/or proceedings before a WTO panel. As a practical matter,
these flexibilities, except in the BRIC countries or perhaps the Republic of South Africa,
are not really available options.
119. See World Trade Organization, Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Trade of
the Least Developed Countries Zanzibar Declaration art. 14, WT/L/409 (Aug. 6, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/themes/ldc-4.htm; World Trade Organization, Minis-
terial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN (01)/Decc/l, ui I.L.M. 746 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min0l_ e/mindecl_e.htm#technology;
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 521-24
(2d ed. 2003).
120. Id. at 15-16.
121. HANSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at 15-16.
122. Id. at xiv.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Foreign Direct Investment and the China Ex-
ception 2 (2007), available at http://www.peteryu.com/fdi.pdf.
125. HASSAN, YAQUB & DIEPEVEEN, supra note 12, at 5. Licensing is not necessarily
bad. The licensee inherently gains a transfer of know-how and general business knowledge
that can potentially be utilized in other ventures. On the other hand, merely exporting for




At least one study found that while strong intellectual property rights
were advantageous in promoting foreign direct investment "among the
least developed nations: among these countries, WTO members do not
have significantly more [foreign direct investment] than non-mem-
bers. ' 126 Unremarkably, intellectual property protection in a developing
country becomes more strategically valuable as it produces and uses more
domestic intellectual property. However, it may be too soon to reach a
firm conclusion. The WTO and the TRIPS Agreement were not in place
until 1994 and not fully obligatory on the least developed countries "until
1 July 2013, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least-devel-
oped country Member, whichever date is earlier. '127 The logic of the law
lies in experience.1 28 Consequently, the theory that piracy is a necessary
stage on the road to economic development may be tested in the future.
If the LCDs become industrialized countries under the TRIPS regime,
this theory will then be disproven.
IV. EFFICIENT PIRACY AND THE INEFFICIENT
FOREIGN AID
This section analyzes two models for economic development. The first
model is that of direct foreign aid. Developed countries provide eco-
nomic or in-kind assistance to developing countries. The second model is
technology transfer and is based on the voluntary technology transfer or
direct foreign investment by the private sector. Often governments pro-
vide economic incentives to domestic companies to transfer technology
through foreign investment in developing countries. Both of these devel-
opment models suffer from similar problems in that they are more re-
sponsive to the domestic political and economic agenda of the private
business entity or the donor-developed country than to the actual or per-
ceived needs of the recipient-developing country. 129 This Article rejects
economic development options limited to these two development models
as a false choice and instead recommends a third development model:
one that acquiesces to, or at least tolerates, uncompensated intellectual
property transfers as long as the core economic incentives that promote
the future production of intellectual property in developed countries are
adequately protected.130
A. FOREIGN AID
Direct foreign aid is often caricatured or stereotyped as being a species
of waste, fraud, abuse, inefficiencies, and political pork-often hurting
126. Id. at 6.
127. GERVAIS, supra note 119, at 521.
128. See The Common Law, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheCommon-
Law (last updated Feb. 25, 2011).
129. See generally JEFFREY F. TAFFET, FOREIGN AID AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE ALLI-
ANCE FOR PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 1-2 (2007).
130. Cf. KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 200.
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more than it helps developing countries. 131 Direct foreign aid or in-kind
aid plays a significant role in alleviating poverty and suffering in the de-
veloping world and a critical role in the provision of public health ser-
vices. 132 Nothing in this Article should be interpreted as justifying
decreasing "investment" in foreign aid. Rather, this Article contends that
foreign aid (excluding humanitarian aid, education aid, and infrastructure
development aid) may be less efficient than uncompensated intellectual
property transfers as a developmental subsidy to promote industrializa-
tion. Under the existing foreign aid regime, a developed country pro-
vides economic support for programs in developing countries that the
developed country finds "worthy," or are at least in the developed coun-
try's self-interest to support.133 In a developed country, these "foreign
aid" projects are often motivated by domestic politics rather than a desire
to meet the enlightened needs of the recipient-developing country. 134
An excellent example of this is the dramatic swings of U.S. foreign aid
funding in the area of reproductive technologies and rights-from fund-
ing condoms and reproductive health services to funding abstinence edu-
cation-depending on which political party holds the White House. a35
These changes in funding priorities represent only the reality of U.S. do-
mestic politics rather than the proven needs of the recipient-developing
countries.
Foreign aid is often provided to developing countries for strategic-geo-
political aims rather than to meet the actual needs of developing coun-
tries or as part of a strategic-economic-efficient development program.1 36
Over the past few decades, U.S. foreign aid has been directed by peren-
nial strategic and peace concerns in the Middle East, the Cold War, or the
Clinton Administration's "environmental, population, and democracy-
building concerns" rather than by economic growth policy. And under
the Bush and Obama Administrations, national security and fighting ter-
rorism are the primary factors in the allocation of U.S. foreign aid rather
than actual needs or development goals.137 The U.S. is not alone in using
foreign aid as an instrument of national political policy.
131. See generally DAMBISA Moyo, DEAD AID: WHY AID is NOT WORKING AND How
THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA xix (2009).
132. See generally Peter Singer, THE LIFE YOU CAN SAVE: ACTING NOW TO END
WORLD POVERTY, at xii-xiii (2009).
133. Foreign aid administered through an international or multi-national organization
often suffers from the same problems as purely bilateral aid. The cure for the problems
identified in this Article is not merely adding additional layers of bureaucracy, inefficiency,
and further opportunities for agency capture and rent-seeking to the development process.
134. Evan Osborne, Rethinking Foreign Aid, 22 CATO J. 297, 306-07 (2002), available
at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/cato/v22n2/cato-v22n2ose01.pdf.
135. See Kim McIntyre, Obama Reverses Bush's Abortion Policy, EXAMINER, Jan. 28,
2009, http://www.examiner.com/first-100-days-in-national/obama-reverses-bush-s-abortion-
policy; TAFFET, supra note 129, at 4-5 (discussing the vagaries of U.S. family planning
policy as a question of foreign aid from 1974 to 1999).




Other donor[] [countries] have their own objectives. For many
years Sweden targeted aid toward "progressive" societies. In France,
governments since De Gaulle have sought to promote the mainte-
nance and spread of French culture and the French language as well
as the preservation of French influence, particularly in West Africa.
French aid has also often been disproportionately concentrated
among nations with which France has extensive commercial ties. In
Japan, aid has historically flowed disproportionately to neighboring
Asian nations in which Japan has the greatest commercial interests,
and Japan has in the past often tied aid to purchases of Japanese
products. In general, pressure groups such as trade associations and,
in the United States, ethnic political blocs have also proven quite
adept at steering aid to their favored recipients. 138
Further, even when foreign aid is not tied to a domestic political
agenda, there are often explicit requirements or implicit understandings
that the recipient country uses the foreign aid to purchase goods and ser-
vices from the donor country. 139 These goods and services are not neces-
sarily the optimal goods or services demanded by the developing
country's economic-development needs, or the goods may be irrelevant,
or even detrimental, to economic development because they are merely
surplus goods for which the donor country is trying to create demand. 140
As one commentator found, "[i]f aid is not particularly given with the
intention to foster economic growth, it is perhaps not surprising that it
does not achieve it." 141
Foreign aid programs are rife with waste, fraud, and inefficiency. 142
Even when foreign aid is targeted wisely and dedicated to economic de-
velopment, foreign aid is still an inefficient means to development, and
the actual delivery of that aid is problematic. 143 The potential for waste,
fraud, and inefficiency exists in both the donor country's ability to pro-
138. Id. at 307 (internal citation omitted).
139. Vexen Crabtree, Which Countries Set the Best Examples?, VEXEN.CO.UK (2005),
http://www.vexen.co.uk/countries/best.html ("Countries that tie less than 10% of aid in-
clude Ireland, Norway and the UK, then Belgium, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. The
USA is the worst, and ties nearly 90% of its aid to developing countries. Italy is the second
worst with 70%.").
140. One may ask: if foreign aid is largely given to the recipient country for the benefit
of the donor nation, then why would a developed country substitute "unlicensed uses" for
foreign aid? Treating unlicensed uses in developing countries as a form of foreign aid or a
developmental subsidy does not preclude donor countries from using direct foreign aid for
national security reasons, as an instrument of soft power, or in response to domestic polit-
ics. Instead, unlicensed uses merely provide one, albeit more advantageous, route to eco-
nomic self-sufficiency for developing countries.
141. Osborne, supra note 134, at 307; see also Nadia Masud & Boriana Yontcheva, Does
Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty? Empirical Evidence from Nongovernmental and Bilateral Aid
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 5, 2005) (finding that NGO aid more effective at
reducing infant mortality that bilateral aid but not significantly more effective on reducing
illiteracy rates).
142. See Development Aid, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developmentaid#
Quality (last updated Feb. 26, 2011).
143. Chuck Neubauer & Matthew Celia, U.S. Aid Meant to Reward Reforms Goes to
Countries Listed as Corrupt, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, available at http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/22/countries-on-us-lists-for-corruption-aid/.
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vide the foreign aid and the recipient country's ability to administer aid
wisely. 144 If either party fails at these tasks then foreign aid is wasted.145
Alternatively, providing direct foreign aid, rather than increasing the
funds available for development or humanitarian relief, often results in a
mere substitution of local funding for foreign funding without any actual
increase in the relevant services.
1 46
Finally, the law of unintended consequences may come into play be-
cause foreign aid oftentimes exacerbates local needs and adds to local
misery in other areas, even while achieving the donor country's intended
goal. 147 Even targeted development aid may also result in failure.
American foreign aid has often harmed the Third World poor. In
Indonesia, the government confiscated subsistence farmers' meager
plots for AID-financed irrigation canals. In Mali, farmers were
forced to sell their crops at giveaway prices to a joint project of AID
and the Mali government. In Egypt, Haiti, and elsewhere, farmers
have seen the prices for their own crops nose-dive when U.S. free
food has been given to their countries.1 48
Therefore, even when foreign aid targeted for economic development
is delivered and spent properly, there is no assurance that the aid will
actually improve the quality of life for the people in the developing coun-
try or promote economic development. In sum, foreign aid is often desig-
nated for the political and economic benefit of the donor country. This
means that waste, fraud, and inefficiency in either or both the donor or
recipient countries (and the iron law of unexpected consequences) make
the question of whether foreign aid efficiently promotes or inefficiently
hinders economic development at best an open question.
B. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INCENTIVES
As of the writing of this Article, it is not clear that the benefits of the
technology transfer provisions of the WTO-TRIPS regime exceed the
losses from eliminating the uncompensated intellectual property transfers
described in this Article. International technology transfer (ITT) does
not appear to be a better tool than foreign aid to promote development.
144. Osborne, supra note 134, at 308-09.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 309; see also Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Unintended Consequences: Does
Aid Promote Arms Races?, 69 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 2, 11-12 (2007) ("Finally,
budgets in most developing countries are partially financed by aid, either directly through
budget support, or indirectly because of the fungibility of projects. There is a widespread
concern that inadvertently aid is financing military spending."), available at http://www.ssn
network.net/uploaded-files/4048.pdf.
147. SAJAL LAHIRI, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FOREIGN AID 422 (2007) (foreign aid
harms exports and results in price increases developing countries); Collier & Hoeffler,
supra note 146, at 11-12.
148. James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS No.
65 (Jan.1986), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html.
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"Technology transfer is neither simple nor cost free. 1 49 There are signifi-
cant costs in translating the technology into an economically, technically,
and sometimes culturally appropriate form so that it is suitable for use in
a developing country.150 For example, the technology may require a
steady power supply in a country where power outages are the norm, or
the resulting products may need to be redesigned so that they do not
need special handling in the marketplace. Under the existing technology
transfer model, either a developed country creates incentives for its do-
mestic industries to invest in developing nations, or private companies,
for strategic market reasons, decide to invest in a developing country. 151
Companies seeking to invest in developing countries face a host of
problems, including distance from markets; poor infrastructure; lack of
human capital (skilled labor); lack of local companies to provide ancillary
goods and services; weak or no enforcement of contracts, property, and
other laws; recipient country licensing, regulatory, and other policies that
discourage or complicate investment; donor country policies that frus-
trate or complicate foreign direct investment; corruption; and political in-
stability. 152 Even in stable, democratic developing countries-with a
well-established rule of law, skilled workforce, and appropriate infra-
structure-there is information asymmetry. Plus, foreign companies may
be unaware of the economic possibilities in these developing countries.
Voluntary, unincentivized foreign direct investment is unlikely to become
a widespread engine for development in lesser-developed countries, 53
except in developing countries with large populations, critical infrastruc-
ture, or natural resources, and even then, this investment-led develop-
ment may only spread to those countries that are perceived as having
potentially extremely lucrative markets.' 54
149. GERVAIS, supra note 119, at 522; Maskus, supra note 17, at 19 ("The bulk of
econometric studies that incorporate measures of investment costs find that they signifi-
cantly reduce FDI and MNE activity at all levels of development.").
150. See GERVAIS, supra note 119, at 522. See generally Peter J. Buckley, International
Technology Transfer by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 9 SMALL Bus. ECON. 67,
77-78 (1997) ("All the evidence suggests that SMEs will not, in aggregate, be the major
suppliers and transferors of technology in the world economy .... In general, technology
developed by the parent is transferred via an international network which relies rather
heavily on joint ventures, alliances and licensing links rather than on foreign direct invest-
ment. The key international transfer mechanism is on-the-job training in the host
country.").
151. See KEITH E. MASKUS, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
33-35 (2004), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CSMaskus.pdf
152. Many of these are also problems in the developed world, but there are sufficient
returns to capital or rewards to justify the risks of entering these markets. Also as a matter
of history and practical necessity, principles of the rule of law are well-established in many
industrialized nations.
153. ORG. FOR INT'L CO-OPERATION & DEV., FOREIGN DmRECT INVESTMENT FOR DE-
VELOPMENT 29-30 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/1959815.pdf.
154. Strangely, this caveat sounds like the so-called BRIC countries. For example, re-
gardless of China's intellectual property policies, or lack thereof, the size of the potential
Chinese market tempted Western private industry with potential rewards-justifying what
was perceived as a very high level of risk. Cf. MASKUS, supra note 17, at 19 ("Multina-
tional firms are less attracted to the least developed countries in part because of their poor
productivity levels in addition to other factors. Rather, affiliate activity tends to be higher
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Coupling voluntary foreign investment with a donor country's incen-
tive to support foreign direct investment does not substantially change
the picture. As one prominent professor found:
First, few new initiatives have been reported; virtually all are con-
tinued from prior policy decisions. Second, there are virtually no
programs aimed specifically at the LDCs, rather their benefits are
available to all developing countries (or even developed countries).
Third, the programs are largely in the form of technical assistance
and capacity building, with payments typically made to source-coun-
try consultants for this purpose. Fourth, where assistance payments
are made to developing countries for the purpose of technology ac-
quisition, it is generally for recognized regional development pur-
poses, such as within the EU or NAFTA. Fifth, measurement of the
extent of technology transfer is typically restricted to the dollar value
of the assistance provided rather than some meaningful measure of
effectiveness or results in transferring information. Of course, it
must be acknowledged that precise measurements of technology
transfer are extremely difficult to make without revealing proprie-
tary information. Sixth, some countries make available for transfer
the results of certain public research programs, though the extent of
active efforts to shape that information varies widely.155
There are policies that developed countries could adopt that would
make foreign direct investment or technology transfer more attractive to
private industry, such as granting preferential access to their markets,
structuring the tax code to encourage investment in developing countries,
providing suitable financing for these investment projects, assisting in de-
veloping a skilled, healthy workforce, and promoting education.156
C. PIRACY AS MARKET EFFICIENCY
This section will analyze whether uncompensated transfers or unli-
censed uses of intellectual property promote development. This section
also analyzes the putative effects of uncompensated transfers on utilita-
rian incentives-essentially, whether the supply, demand, and price struc-
tures of developing nations can be segregated from those of the
developed world.1 57 As discussed above, both foreign aid and technology
in countries with a reasonable supply of technical skills and access to an effective labour
force.").
155. MAsKus, supra note 17, at 35.
156. See generally Dirk Willem te Velde, Understanding Developed Country Efforts to
Promote Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: The Example of the United
Kingdom Transnational Corporations, Dec. 2007, available at http://findarticles.comlp/
articles/mi_6790/is 3 16/ain30890020/; United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, Oct. 15, 2010, Developing Productive Capacities in Least Developed Countries:
Issues for Discussion, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldc2010llen.pdf.
157. This Article offers its advice with one significant caveat that developed countries
may not look to the pricing structure of the pirated economy to determine developed coun-
tries prices. Demagogues may not point the lower developing country "pirated" price to
contend those prices should be charged in the developed world nor make arguments that
intellectual property rights holders are gouging consumers in the developed world, or com-
plaints regarding developing countries free riding on the research investments of the devel-
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transfer are inefficient modalities to support efficient economic develop-
ment. 158 This Article assumes the unremarkable but debatable proposi-
tion that free markets are more efficient than regulated markets in
allocating resources and promoting economic growth. 159
This Article then moves to the highly speculative assumption that a
free marketplace in unlicensed intellectual property is more likely to pro-
mote economic development in developing countries than either direct
foreign aid or incentivized technology transfer. Further, one lesson that
may be drawn from history is that those countries that have successfully
transitioned from developing or agricultural economies to developed or
industrial economies all did so during periods of lax or no transnational
enforcement of intellectual property rights. In fact, the development
norm in history was not the enforcement of intellectual property rights
but, instead, the positive flouting of the intellectual property rights of
non-citizens as an aid to national development. Unlicensed uses may not
have the unintended consequences of foreign aid. The individualized de-
cisions of free market participants should assure that the negative exter-
nalities of uncompensated use are minimized, and unlike government
programs, once the negative externalities are noted, the free market may
act more quickly to ameliorate the inadvertent effects of transferred
technology.
1. Utilitarian Intellectual Property Rights
There are many theories that justify the periods of legal exclusivity
granted to intellectual property rights holders. 160 The utilitarian justifica-
tion for intellectual property rights is that absent a period of time in
which only the creator or inventor of intellectual property may exploit
their work, there would be no economic incentive to create new works of
oped world. Further, "[m]ost of the clamor that pharmaceutical prices are unfairly low in
foreign countries is based solely on anecdotal evidence." Patricia Danzon, The Price of
Pharmaceuticals: International Comparisons and the Effects of Controls, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES. (Dec.12, 2003), http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/682?page=
summary. "Pharmaceutical price differentials across countries roughly reflect differences
in income. Adjusting the price indices by per capita income suggests that drug price levels
are actually slightly higher in other major markets. For the basket used in this study, drug
prices in Canada are 4 percent higher than in the United States and are 25 percent higher
in the United Kingdom. In Chile and Mexico, prices are nearly 430 percent higher than
found in the U.S. when normalized for income. While the American public protests that
drug prices abroad are too low, the data suggest that we in fact are asking low-income
countries to contribute more for pharmaceuticals than they can reasonably afford." Id.
"Pharmaceutical R&D is a large, globally-joint fixed cost, where optimal pricing is a func-
tion of demand elasticities. Using income as a proxy for elasticity, we conclude that higher
drug prices for high-income countries are both efficient and equitable. For the United
States to artificially dampen prices through reimportation or price controls would create
inappropriate price uniformity and lower social welfare." Id.
158. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
159. WARWICK E. MURRAY, GEOGRAPHIES OF GLOBALIZATION 137-38 (David Bell &
Stephen Wyn Williams eds., 2006).
160. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3-4 (2003); Menell, supra note 26.
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authorship or to create new inventions. 161 This presupposes that, while
intellectual property works require some investment to create, once
works are created they are easily copied so that a competitor not bearing
the costs of creation could undercut the price charged by the crea-
tor-investor and readily flood the market with cheaper reproductions of
the protected work. 62 This utilitarian justification for intellectual prop-
erty rights requires an ongoing, careful calibration between incentives
and the creation of new forms of intellectual property. 163 Unfortunately,
rather than calibrating the intellectual property rights incentives neces-
sary to create new intellectual property with the costs and returns on in-
vestment, the longest period of time and the most robust degree of
exclusivity necessary to provide an incentive to develop the most costly
copyrighted work or patented innovation then becomes the de jure norm
for all forms intellectual property protection for different classes of
works.164 Consequently, for many industries and types of works, the term
and scope of existing intellectual property protection is well in excess of
the level of protection necessary to provide an adequate or reasonable
incentive to create new intellectual property. Over time, the scope of
intellectual property rights has been expanding. Subject matters such as
genetics, business methods, and software are now patentable, and works
created long ago, by authors who are long dead, are enjoying enlarge-
ment of copyright protection as their works are exploited in new medi-
ums and the copyright term is constantly extended.' 65 Therefore, because
most forms of intellectual property are overprotected, in that the statu-
tory incentives are well in excess of those reasonably necessary to provide
a reasonable economic incentive to create new intellectual property, in-
tellectual property holders are capturing a significant part of what should
be the consumer surplus and imposing a significant deadweight loss on
the economy.1 66 As a result, some minor slippage or leakage of the intel-
lectual property rights holders' claim to a "global zone" of exclusivity
should have no effect on the necessary reasonable incentive structure to
161. See Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A Psy-
chological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1613, 1623-24 (2005).
162. See RICHARD A. SPINELO & HERMAN T. TAVANI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN A NETWORKED WORLD: THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (2004).
163. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics Of Improvement In Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 995-97 (1997). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004) (pub-
lished by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies), available at http://www.
aei.org/docLib/20040608 Landes.pdf.
164. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers In Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1629-31 (2003).
165. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives Of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Bounda-
ries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH 4, 8-14 (2003).
166. Rachelle Cooper Dreyfuss, State Street or Easy Street: Is Patenting Business Meth-




create or innovate. 167 In economic terms, these unauthorized and un-
compensated uses proposed in this Article decrease the deadweight loss
on the economy and increase the consumer surplus without affecting the
monopoly profits that the intellectual property rights holder enjoys as a
reward for her creativity and industry. Because developing countries do
not purchase licenses or licensed goods in any significant quantity, these
unlicensed uses in developing countries should have little or no effect on
the GDP or balance of payments (BOP) of the developed country.' 68
2. Piracy Is an Efficient Development Modality
The question to be asked may be whether unlicensed uses are more
efficient in promoting developmental goals than direct foreign aid or in-
centives for technology transfer. A market-driven policy for intellectual
property or technology transfer that permits access to and use of intellec-
tual property in response to market demand for technology or informa-
tion in a local developing country's markets will promote development
more efficiently than either direct foreign aid or technology transfers.' 69
History teaches that uncompensated intellectual property transfers
(piracy) as a developmental policy may have much to commend it be-
cause uncompensated transfers may mark an attempt to return to the
well-worn paths that led to past successful economic development. Many
now-developed nations passed through this stage of taking and exploiting
uncompensated transfers of intellectual property. 170 This Article does
not suggest that developed country intellectual property rights holders
should grant developing countries an indefinite period or a blank check.
Rather, as was discussed previously, at some level of economic develop-
ment, nations start noticing that the economic development of other na-
tions is free-riding on the intellectual property rights belonging to their
citizens, and only then do these nations begin to develop strong domestic
laws protecting intellectual property rights and, ultimately, become vocal
advocates for strong international intellectual property protection.171
National self-interest and long-term economic development is the ulti-
mate limitation on uncompensated uses.
167. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 249 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("one
might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will mean the
transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights-copyrights
that, together, already will have earned many billions of dollars in royalty 'reward."').
168. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, THE REAL
WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 8 (2010), available at http://
ndr.org/en/reports/globa/hdr20lO/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) (1.44 billion people live on
$1.25 or less per day.)
169. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), available at http://
www.econlib.org/library/Smitth/smWNt.html.
170. CHANG, supra note 57, at 85.
171. Yu, supra note 9, at 12; cf. DUNCAN MATrHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 111 (2002), available at http://questia.coml
pmast?a=Otd=102810332 (discussing that as they developed domestic intellectual property
assets, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea became strong proponents of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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Most individuals living in a market economy take it as a given that
markets are better than the governments in allocating scarce resources. 172
Markets supplied by unlicensed producers suffer from fewer transaction
costs and are more responsive to local needs. 173 For example, unlicensed
markets avoid the transactions costs associated with administering for-
eign aid. Free market piracy lacks the inefficiency of what is essentially a
command economy of intellectual property or technology demand cre-
ated by government policies. Unlicensed use is not a response to the po-
litical vagaries of the domestic or foreign policies of the donor or
recipient countries, but rather, it is a response to the felt or perceived
needs of market participants.
There is less inefficiency in a market for unlicensed uses in the delivery
of the intellectual property; each market player receives the unit of intel-
lectual property or technology that the market participant demands at a
price that is responsive to its individualized needs and the marginal costs
of production. 174 Prices for tangible embodiments of goods protected by
intellectual property law may remain low because intellectual property
rights will not serve as a barrier to market entry and the production of
these goods. Potentially, there will be numerous entities competing to
sell goods in the marketplace and thus, creating something that approxi-
mates a free market for these products. 175 Technology or intellectual
property may be modified to suit local conditions without the transaction
costs of negotiating a licensee agreement or seeking permissions. 176 Ad-
aptation, or even imitative use, of technology to meet local needs is often
the foundation of an independent local research and development sec-
172. See Frank A.G. den Butter & John Hudson, Standardization and Compliance
Costs: Relevant Developments at EU Level, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE 145-47 (Andre Nijsen et al. eds., 2009); Justin
Fox, The Growing Consensus on U.S. Competitiveness, HARVARD Bus. REV. BLOGS (Sept.
29, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/fox/2010/09/economists-vs-b-school-profess.html;
ANDRE NI'SEN ET AL., BUSINESS REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE COSTS AND BEN-
EFITS OF COMPLIANCE 145-47 (2009).
173. See Butter & Hudson, supra note 172.
174. See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Private Orderings and Intellec-
tual Property: What is the Best Incentive System?, in LEGAL ORDERINGS AND ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS 133-53 (earlier draft available at http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/archive/
scotchmer-when-is-ip-best.pdf). Of course the marginal cost to the pirate does not include
the very economically significant fixed costs of research, development, marketing, licens-
ing, regulatory compliance, etc. that were paid by the intellectual property rights holder or
investor.
175. Id. at 150 n.9. Of course, this Article is assuming away the effects any distortions
in the market caused by organized crime or government corruption.
176. In the United States computer software is protected under copyright law as a liter-
ary work. Lateef Mtima, So Dark The CON(TU) Of Man: The Quest For A Software
Derivative Work Right In Section 117, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 23, 74 n.164 (2007). If a software
licensee modifies copyrighted software even to remove "bugs," the licensee risks creating
an infringing unauthorized derivative work. Id. at 80 n.171; see also Berne Convention,
supra note 101, art. 12 ("Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right
of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works."). So modi-
fying or adapting software or any copyrighted work for use in a developing country will
require permission from the copyright owner.
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tor. 177 If local industry has to understand a product in order to replicate
it and then build, buy, or modify the technology to produce the product,
these efforts will then result in truly effective technology transfer. 78 An
industry in a developing country which is developed from independently
reverse-engineering a product and the associated manufacturing process
has gained more than one that merely received an instruction manual,
foreign advisors, and a prefabricated factory. This, of course, may be less
true in some industries than in others-for example, the mere digital du-
plication of copyrighted works will have less research and development
spillover than developing an indigenous printing industry to pirate physi-
cal books. 179 And, the very least developed countries may lack any imita-
tive industrial capacity. These countries may benefit greatly from
unlicensed access to copyrighted scientific articles, educational materials,
practical training manuals, or other materials that improve that country's
human capital.
Moreover, industry in the developed nations may be unprepared or un-
willing to meet the needs of developing countries. For instance a devel-
oping country may have a significant supply of computers that can only
run vl.0 software. Producers in the developed world no longer support
that version because the demand in the developed world is for v3.0
software, which only runs on computers with faster processors and more
memory. Developing country industries may still desire to purchase first
generation, fully functional-but by industrialized-nation standards-ob-
solete machinery that is still under patent protection. Yet, the patent
owner may be unwilling or unable to provide the machinery, parts, or
service in the developing country. In fact, the patent owner may not even
be willing to license the patents for use in the developing world. In a
developing country, technology that is obsolete in the developed world
may be more appropriate, still useful, proven, and cheaper.1 80
3. Marginal Costs, Marginal Losses, and Foreign Aid as Marginal
Compensation
Academic and industry leaders approach the battle of high versus low
barriers of intellectual property protection, in both the arena of public
opinion and before legislative bodies, as an all-or-nothing, zero-sum
177. See PAZ ESTRELLA E. TOLENTINO, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THIRD
WORLD MULTINATIONALS 46-47 (1993).
178. See Amy Jocelyn Glass & Kamal Saggi, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in
International Technology Transfer, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT Ec-
ONOMICS (Amitava Dutt & Jaime Ros eds.), available at http://econweb.tamu.edu/aglass/
DevHandbook.pdf; Howard Pack & Kamal Saggi, Inflows of Foreign Technology and In-
digenous Technological Development, Inflows of Foreign Technology and Indigenous Tech-
nology Development, 1 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 81 (1997), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.111/1467-9361.00007/pdf.
179. Fair Use Since the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://correctingcourse.columbia.edu/paper-tushnet.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2011); cf KNELLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 8.
180. See RICHARD OUMA-ONYANGO, INFORMATION RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45 (1997).
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game. But there is academic research that suggests that some policies
governing spillovers and externalities may approach a Pareto optimal so-
lution-benefiting both innovators and society at large in both developed
countries and developing countries. 181 Intellectual property and technol-
ogy transfers are not zero-sum games; properly administered, they may
actually change the size of the pie.182 Intellectual property is character-
ized by high costs of creation compared with the relatively low costs of
subsequent reproduction. 183 While the cost of producing the first and
subsequent units of intellectual property is relatively easy to calculate,
calculating the losses caused by piracy of intellectual property is often
problematic. 184
Accurately valuing the economic losses to intellectual property holders
in developed countries is significant because the basis of the utilitarian
model is the assumption that an intellectual property holder is entitled to
a period of market exclusivity (or monetary damages when that exclusiv-
ity is breached) as an incentive to produce new innovation and creative
works.' 85 This section will briefly evaluate some of the problems in calcu-
lating the economic damages that intellectual property rights holders
claim are caused by unlicensed use in the developing world. In the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, this Article assumes that the marginal
cost per unit of unlicensed use (actual losses) in developing nations is
relatively small. This Article also posits, while tacitly accepting, unli-
censed uses in developing countries is the preferred model, and the eco-
nomically less efficient solution (but the politically expedient one) may
be for some developed nations to compensate their citizens for their ac-
tual losses caused by unlicensed use in developing countries, rather than
to provide incentives for authorized technology transfer. Basically, for-
eign aid funds purchase "licenses" for developing countries rather than
forcing compliance with existing, inefficient international intellectual
property norms.
181. Bronwyn H. Hall, Contribution to the International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Second Edition (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.berkley.
edu/-bhhall/papers/bhh06 less rdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
182. See FALVEY & FOSTER, supra note 88, at 9-16.
183. LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (2010).
184. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT
AND PIRATED GOODS, (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf.
In the United States, Congress recognized the problems inherent in determining actual
damages and has permitted courts to use statutory damages as a proxy or effectuate other
purposes that fall under the market-incentives created by intellectual property. See 17
U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006) (trademark). Under the Patent
Act, the court may award actual damages or a reasonable royalty or enhanced damages for
willful infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). There are similar provisions in European
law. See Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
185. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual
Property Monopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5-6 (1998).
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a. Marginal Costs of Production of Intellectual Property
Economically motivated innovators (inventors and authors) will not in-
vest in the production of intellectual property unless their expected re-
turn on the investment is greater than the cost of their initial investment
to produce the new "unit" of potentially patentable or copyrightable sub-
ject matter.186 Intellectual property is non-rivalrous. Once the innovator
creates the first unit of intellectual property, an imitative competitor (or
pirate) or developing country user could immediately copy the intellec-
tual property and compete in the marketplace at a lower price than the
innovator. Accordingly, the innovator would lose sales to the imitator,
the innovator would not be able to recoup its substantial investment in
research and development; and eventually, there would be a scarcity of
innovation and creative works because of a lack of investment. 187
In a utilitarian model system, it is an axiom that innovators ought to be
rewarded. 188 The question under the existing global intellectual property
regime is whether innovators are justly rewarded or unjustly enriched.
One problem is that the consuming public remembers the blockbuster
successes rather than the more numerous failures of innovators. While
the public remembers Apple Computer's successful competitors in the
marketplace-the Mac®, the iPod®, the iPhone®, and now the iPad®-
many consumers do not remember some of Apple's numerous failures-
the Lisa, the 15.5 pound Macintosh Portable®, the Newton®, and the
CYBERDOG®.189 Creators of blockbuster products must pay for the re-
search and development that leads to development of the product, and
they must also pay for the marketing of the product. But the revenues
from a few blockbuster products must also pay for the costs of failed
products, subsidize future research, and reward investment if there are to
be new products.190
Conceding that, under the utilitarian justification for intellectual prop-
erty, a period of exclusivity is necessary in order to recoup investments,
the question is whether the United States, the European Union, the de-
veloped world, the BRIC countries, or the known universe should be in
the geographic scope of this market-exclusivity.' 9 ' The United States
186. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION § 10.1 (1998).
187. Id.
188. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 26, at 10 (discussing competing methods of spur-
ring innovation, such as prized or bounties, patronage, government funding, etc. and re-
jecting them in preference of a utilitarian approach). But see Adam D. Moore, Intellectual
Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments,
26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 613-22 (2003).
189. See, e.g., Rachel Rosmarin, Apple's Biggest Duds, FORBES, Mar. 31, 2006, available
at http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/30/newton-apple-lisacx_rr_O331APPLEDUDS.html.
190. See SHAYNE C. GAD, HANDBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 163
(2007).
191. Of course, a similar result could be achieved by changing the temporal duration of
intellectual property rights. However, proposing a temporal duration solution is outside
the scope of this Article because this Article presupposes minimal changes to the scope of
the existing intellectual property rights regime and the economic incentives provided in the
developed nations for the creation of intellectual property.
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alone is a sufficiently large market to justify creating innovation and new
copyrighted works.192 The United States is a sufficiently large market in
which many non-U.S. companies pursue intellectual property protec-
tion.193 With the exception of products designed for a specific subculture
(for example, a non-English-language copyrighted work) or for special-
ized needs, most pharmaceutical products, medical devices, inventions,
and copyrighted works would still be produced even if the only market
for these products was the United States.194 Assuming that the United
States is not a sufficiently large market in which an innovator can recoup
his or her investment by exploiting intellectual property rights, then con-
tinuing down this slippery slope the innovator could add the member
states of the European Union.195 If the United States and the European
Union together are not sufficiently large, then she could add Japan, South
Korea, Singapore, India, and China as additional markets.
At some point, long before considering entering the developing na-
tions' markets (especially the LDCs), the potential market for the pat-
ented invention or the copyrighted work is sufficiently large so that even
the largest expenditure in research, development, and marketing could
potentially be profitably recouped so as to justify the initial invest-
ment.196 With the limited exception of innovation that exclusively serves
developing countries, for example, drugs that treat illnesses that are
borne largely by individuals in the developing world, market exclusivity
in the developed world alone should serve as an adequate incentive for
most new innovation. Assuming, arguendo, that some innovations re-
quire the exclusive market to extend from developed nations to newly
industrialized developing nations, it is still difficult to imagine why a pe-
riod of geographic market exclusivity in the developing world is ever the
extra marginal unit of incentive (revenue) that makes or breaks a deci-
sion to invest in that innovation. 197
192. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of The United States, tbl. 683 (Average
Annual Expenditures of All Consumer Units by Selected Major Types of Expenditure),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/llsO683.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2011).
193. See Nat'l Sci. Found., Industry Technology and the Global Marketplace: Patented
Inventions, in SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2004, at 6-23 to 6-24, available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c6/c6s4.htm#c6s4l2 ("patents granted to foreign inven-
tors generally accounted for about 45-47 percent of total U.S. patents granted").
194. The gross domestic product of the United States is $14.59 Trillion. See Jeff Carter,
20/20 Hindsight, http://pointsandfigures.com/2OlO07/08/2020-hindsight/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
195. The gross domestic product of the European Union is $14.89 Trillion. See Central
Intelligence Agency, European Union, THE WORLD FACrBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/ee.html.
196. The reader is encouraged to slide down the slippery slope of incentive to decide
when some developing country markets are not worth the trouble of exploiting.
197. The size of the theoretical markets in many developing countries would provide no
additional incentive for additional R&D expenditures. Currently, the largest pharmaceuti-
cal companies spend more on R&D than the GDP of some of the poorest countries in the
world. Compare List of Countries by GDP (nominal), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List-ofCountries_byGDP_(nominal) (last updated Feb. 14, 2011) (includes the
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b. Marginal Losses (Damages) of Piracy
The economic value and economic costs of intellectual piracy is at best
speculative. 198 The actual market value of unlicensed use in the devel-
oped world, while certainly much less than in the developing countries, is
a hotly debated topic.199 The claimed losses experienced by intellectual
property owners depend on how one defines a loss for the purposes of
calculating damages. The market for pharmaceutical products is readily
understood by consumers and is therefore an excellent example of the
problem of determining the value of the loss to the rights holder because
of so-called piracy.2°° The proper measure is the actual value of the loss
to the owner of a patented product or the copyrighted work. Unfortu-
nately, measuring intellectual property damages is problematic: Is it the
cost of the product had a licensed product been sold, the loss of the prof-
its on the sale of a licensed product, the market price of the counterfeit
copy, or the counterfeiter's profits on the sale? 201
GDPs of the least developed countries), with MedTrack, Industry Statistics, http://www.
medtrack.com/research/Istats.asp#listl (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
198. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 183; WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL
PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 15-16 (2009) (discussing the proof of "losses" caused
by Napster).
199. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 183.
200. Patented pharmaceutical or medical products that can be reproduced cheaply, but
are only available at prohibitively expensive prices could be used to demonstrate this point
as "[t]he UNDP Human Development Report 2000 notes that generic production of the
HIV treatment flucanazole in India has kept the price at $55 for 150 milligrammes com-
pared with $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia and $817 in the Philippines. Similarly, a
report to the CESCR has noted that the AZT treatment is produced at a supply cost of $48
a month in India as compared with $239 in the United States." ECONOMIC & SOCIAL
COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 13 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.unhchr.chfHuridocdaHuridoca.nsf/e06a5300f9faO238025668700518ca4/
590516104e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). In
some developing countries it is not uncommon to spend 50% of the household income on
out of pocket medical expenses. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., TRACKING HOUSE-
HOLD HEALTH EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH MAJOR POPULA-
TION-BASED SURVEYS 5 (2009), available at www.healthsystems2O2O.org/fllesI2312_fileHH
surveysFin.pdf
201. Along this line of analyzing gain rather than loss, should one off-set the alleged
loss by any positive effects caused by the piracy? Intellectual property law does not allow
for these offsets, but the laws of economics should permit them when analyzing the effect
of piracy on the market. For example, in the context of on-line music sampling, sampling is
allegedly an infringing use, but it may also result in increased exposure and, possibly, in-
creased sales to the copyright owner. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). In the developing world, the better example is a copy-
righted and patented operating system and office productivity suite. Locally, computer
users cannot afford to pay hundreds of dollars for an operating system and a suite of office
products-word processing, spreadsheet, presentation programs, etc. If a local user pirates
the office productivity suite, it will develop an entrenched user base. Eventually, a devel-
oping country becomes sufficiently developed, and users will demand and be willing to pay
for the licensed product. But if there is no piracy, the developing country users adopt a
free-ware open-source solution. These users will quickly learn that an open-source operat-
ing system like Linux can compete with proprietary systems and that open office software
can compete with its proprietary competitors on quality as well as cost. Eventually, as the
developing country residents can afford to purchase proprietary software, the vendors of
proprietary software will find barriers to entry: consumers will be satisfied with their free
software or commercial entities will not want to face the expenses of purchasing the propri-
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With a bit of thought, a conniving counterfeiter could construct mea-
sures that actually result in a net gain rather than a loss to the rights
holder. For example, a pirate could prove that the purchase of the coun-
terfeit simulates sales of complimentary licensed products (builds brand
awareness), serves as "advertising" for the licensed product, or prevents
competing licensed products from entering the marketplace. Pirated cop-
ies often keep competing open-source or domestically produced products
out of the market thus eliminating competition and preserving "first
mover" advantage for the intellectual property rights holder.202
In developing countries, there is little evidence of substituting the unli-
censed product for purchasing an authorized, licensed product. At devel-
oped-country prices, a poverty-level worker in a developing country
could spend more than one month's income for one month's treatment of
an illness, or a music compact disc could represent more than twelve days
of work. At developed-country prices, there is little or no market de-
mand for even life-saving medicines in developing countries where earn-
ing $1.25 a day is considered being above the poverty level.20 3 In sum,
unlicensed production and sale of these products in a developing country
will result in no more than nominal (if any) injury to the patent owner
unless these unlicensed products are later exported to developed coun-
tries.20 4 So, this Article assumes that much of the internal domestic use
of unlicensed intellectual property in developing nations does not result
in a substitute for the purchase of or demand for the licensed product.20 5
If there is no substitution for demand and no substitution for actual
purchase, the developed country rights holder is not injured, at least in
the utilitarian sense under patent or copyright law. Of course, there may
be reputational or injury to goodwill under principles of trademark law or
moral rights, which are outside the scope of this Article.
In the easiest case, if there has been a substitution for the purchase of
the licensed good by the purchase of a pirated product at the same price,
then the damages are readily determined. But, in the event that the pur-
etary software as well as training their employees on its use. A modicum of piracy may be
the cheapest method of brand development in many developing countries.
202. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 183, at 15; Kathleen
Reavis Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection Strategies,
37 MGMT. Sci. 125-39 (1991); Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unautho-
rized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externali-
ties, 42 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 155-66 (1994).
203. See Fund to Assist Ag in Developing Countries Could be Vital, AGWEEK, Sept.
21, 2010, http:www.agweek.com/event/article/id/17166/.
204. See id. In 2005, approximately 3 billion people earn $2.00 or less per day. See
World Bank Dev. Res. Group, World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at
$2 a Day, http://data.worldbank.orglindicator/SI.POV.2DAY/countries (last visited Feb. 8,
2011) (providing country-by-country statistics).
205. This Article assumes for the purposes of this analysis that pirated intellectual prop-
erty is produced and consumed solely in developing countries that could not afford the
market price established in the developed world. And, it also assumes that the circulation
of these goods or services remains internal to the developing country or otherwise does not




chaser would never have bought a licensed product, the harm to the intel-
lectual property rights owner, if any, is totally speculative. 20 6 This point
may be demonstrated anecdotally by an example drawn from popular
music. A recent popular song ranged in price from $8.50 in India to
$20.50 in South Africa. 20 7 But, in terms of local comparative purchasing
power, the price of the same song ranged from only $75 in Mexico to $760
in India.20 8 A pirated copy in India costs between $0.40 and $1.20 in local
purchasing power.20 9 This approximates the marginal costs of reproduc-
tion and includes a small profit for the pirates and other infringers. 210
One does not have to belabor this point to bring it home. Few if any
purchasers, even in an affluent, developed country, would pay between
$75 and $760 for a compact disc of popular music.21 1 Therefore, demand
for popular music at those prices, even in the United States or European
Union, would border on zero. 212 Similarly, in the developing world, there
is often little or no demand for the licensed product at the developed-
country monopoly price.213 Consequently, unlicensed uses do not result
in actual lost sales.2 14 So, there is no actual economic loss to the intellec-
tual property rights owners, but these uses do result in a great benefit to
the developing country.21 5
Even in the poorest of countries, there are some individuals sufficiently
affluent to pay the developed-country market price. This Article assumes
that the few affluent individuals in a developing country will buy the li-
censed product either because the product is a Veblen or Giffen good, so
that the quantity demanded is unresponsive to normal changes in price,
or because of the quality assurance, warranty, or other benefits that ac-
company the licensed product. In theory, even in a developing country,
the licensed and the unlicensed goods markets may remain largely sepa-
rated. This paradigm of tacit toleration of unauthorized use is justified as
206. See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001).
207. David Weinberger, Piracy in Developing Countries, JOHO THE BLOG (Feb. 2,
2010, 1:58 PM), http://davidweinberger.sys-con.com/node/1270990. See also KARAGANIS,
supra note 89, at 56-58 (comparing the legal price, comparative purchasing power legal
price, pirate price, and comparative purchasing power pirate price for two works in U.S.,
Russia, Brazil, South Africa, India, and Mexico).




212. Id. The author has done an exhaustive search of Amazon.com® and searched the
web using the Google® search engine and was unable to find any individual music CDs in
the $75 to $760 price range. The author assumes, arguendo, that in the United States or
Europe, if there was an actual market for music CDs in this price range, someone would be
producing CDs at these price points to meet this pent-up demand.
213. Rhetorically, it would seem to be an irrational exchange to trade ten days of sub-
sistence wages for one music CD.
214. Cf The Impact of Digital Piracy on Music Sales: A Cross-Country Analysis, INT'L
Soc. Sci. REV., Sept. 2009, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-12169443/The-impact-
of-digital-piracy.html (even in the affluent, developed world it is debatable whether music
downloading reduces sales of music).
215. See David Hurlbut, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol
for Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 392 (1994).
[Vol. 64
Do as I Say (Not as I Did)
long as there is minimal or no leakage from the unlicensed sales market-
place into the licensed sales marketplace.2 16 If there is significant leak-
age, then unlicensed goods will become cheaper substitutes for licensed
goods, and the intellectual property owner will experience a real eco-
nomic loss. 217 The utilitarian regime of intellectual property rights incen-
tives in the developed nations may require a virtually impermeable
barrier between licensed and unlicensed uses-that is, if the uncompen-
sated technology or intellectual property transfer model proposed in this
Article is not to undercut the intellectual property incentives that are as-
sumed to underlie and motivate the creation of new intellectual property
and if the model is to be politically palatable to governments and rights
holders.218 Under the circumstances posited in this Article, because there
is no demand at the seller's prices (in developing countries), even though
a rational seller could complete the transaction without a loss, other mea-
sures for assessing the rights-holder's damages also fail, such as a hypo-
thetical arm's-length transaction because an arm's length transaction
assumes both a willing seller and a willing buyer.
Rhetorically, at first blush, this Article's recommended approach of
tacitly tolerating unauthorized uses that do not result in economic dam-
ages to the rights holder is readily condemned because it costs little to
intellectual property rights owners and conveys great value to consumers
in the developing world. Thus, intellectual property consumers or users
in developing countries are unjustly enriched because they fail to pay the
price demanded. It may just feel wrong or unfair for someone to "get"
something for nothing. One must first presuppose the contentious as-
sumption that intellectual property is an actual form of property, with
rights that are closely analogous to real property or other forms of tangi-
216. Cf Hsiu-Li Chen, Gray Marketing: Does it Hurt the Manufacturers?, ATL. ECON. J.
3-4 (Mar. 2009), at 3-4, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/198
413006_.html (the effects of gray market or parallel imports on profits). This Article as-
sumes that if gray market goods, which are legitimate but unauthorized for export in to the
home market result in loss profits, then black market goods which are totally illegitimate
will result in even a greater loss.
217. Cf. id.
218. This is a natural "assume a can opener" point. This Article contends that a policy
of vigorous law enforcement in the developed world with the implacable use of self-help
and technical protection measures-like digital rights management in copyright, packaging
and supply chain control in patent and copyright, and the use of RFID chips and
barcodes-can stop leakages into the developed countries when coupled with appropriate
incentives to keep the pirate and their government "honest." See AIDS, Drug Prices, and
Generic Drugs, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2011)
("Negotiations with Big Pharma have led to a system of 'tiered' pricing. Tiered pricing
means that the price at which the big pharmaceutical companies sell their drugs is calcu-
lated using formulas based on average income per head, leading to lower prices in poor
countries." For example, one could "require" that unlicensed pharmaceutical products
must be readily distinguishable from the licensed product.).
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ble property.21 9 First, intellectual property rights are territorial.220 A
claim of theft must therefore presuppose that the developed country's
intellectual property rights owners actually have enforceable intellectual
property rights in the developing country. As Professor Lemley demon-
strated in his analysis of judicial opinions, the term intellectual property is
of recent vintage.221 "The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual prop-
erty cases is accordingly closely identified not with common law property
rules in general, but with a particular view of property rights as the right
to capture or internalize the full social value of property. '222 Professor
Lemley later concluded:
The assumption that intellectual property owners should be enti-
tled to capture the full social surplus of their invention runs counter
to our economic intuitions in every other segment of the economy.
We do not permit producers to capture the full social value of their
output. Nor do we permit the owners even of real property to inter-
nalize the full positive externalities associated with their property. 223
Moral traditions support these unauthorized and uncompensated uses,
and the legal claim against uncompensated transfers under the conditions
described in this Article rests on weak grounds. Morally, one could ana-
lyze these uncompensated uses as akin to the theft of property. 224 Le-
gally this argument seems to rely on the well-developed doctrine of unjust
enrichment. 225 First, from the perspective of many developing nations,
unlicensed uses are merely restitution or reparations based on a history of
past colonial exploitation.226 Developing nations may also question the
219. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (arguing that "treating intellectual property . . . 'just like' real
property is a mistake as a practical matter"). See generally SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra
note 100 (discussing the legislative and judicial process by which products of the mind
became cognizable as property).
220. Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
13, 40 (2006). See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (copyright); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (patent).
221. Lemley, supra note 217, at 1033-34 (reporting that the historical number and per-
centage of IP cases using the term Intellectual Property was 9 (0.3%) in 1944-1954, 12
(0.3%) in 1954-1964, 20 (0.4%) in 1964-1974, 140 (3.2%) in 1974-1984, 743 (13%) in
1984-1994, and 3,211 (37.8%) in 1994-2004).
222. Id.; see also PATRY, supra note 56, at 109-32 (discussing the role of reifying intel-
lectual property as real property in the copyright wars).
223. Lemley, supra note 217, at 1046.
224. In the physical property, in the case of a theft, the owner is actually deprived of
control, possession, or use of property. Because intellectual property is not rivalrous, the
"theft" can take place without the rights holder being aware of it or even suffering any
measurable damages, thus, the injury ranges from the loss of the right or expectation of
exclusive control to actual economic damages because of loss of sales or licensing revenues.
225. The concept of unjust enrichment is also recognized in civil law and international
human rights. See, e.g., Margalynne Armstrong, Reparations Litigation: What About Un-
just Enrichment?, 81 OR. L. REV. 771, 774 nn.15-16 (2002).
226. See Governance by Multi-Nation Organizations and International Law, 2 INT'L
Bus. TRANSACrIONS § 25.5 (2010) ("The aspirations of developing nations of the 1970s, to
achieve development through transfers (reparations for alleged abuses of colonialism,
transfers of technology based on ideas being the patrimony of mankind rather than subject
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legitimacy of an international intellectual property system that they did
not participate in creating and does not recognize their claims of property
rights in cultural knowledge or their natural biological resources. 2
27
In the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, the Bible teaches:
For six years you are to sow your fields and harvest the crops, but
during the seventh year let the land lie unplowed and unused. Then
the poor among your people may get food from it, and the wild ani-
mals may eat what is left. Do the same with your vineyard and your
olive grove. 228
When you reap the harvest of your land, do not reap to the very
edges of your field or gather the gleanings of your harvest. Do not
go over your vineyard a second time or pick up the grapes that have
fallen. Leave them for the poor and the foreigner. I am the LORD
your God.22
9
These are clear statements of the moral claim of the poor to a surplus
or a "free ride" that does not affect the owner's legitimate interests in
their property rights. Likewise, the Third Pillar of Islam is an obligation
to give to the poor.230 One may suppose that most religions and moral
teachings, although not defining property, do impose some obligation on
property owners to share from their surplus with the needy in their com-
munity. As posited in this Article, developing countries have markets
that cannot be effectively exploited by intellectual property owners in the
developed world. Therefore, uncompensated use in these developing
markets is akin to leaving the gleanings behind or not reaping to the very
edge of the property right.23 1
For the purposes of this Article, there seems to be little difference be-
tween the common and civil law concepts of unjust enrichment (legal
claim), 232 so this Article will engage in a common law analysis of this
to private ownership, etc.), have been largely subordinated to a desire to achieve develop-
ment through self help.").
227. See Yu, supra note 9, at 10-15.
228. Exodus 23:10-11 (New Int'l Version).
229. Leviticus 19:10 (New Int'l Version); see also id. at 23:22; Deuteronomy 24:19.
230. See GEOFF TEECE, RELIGION IN Focus: ISLAM 16 (2004).
231. In theory, a rational, profit-maximizing intellectual property owner exercising ro-
bust price discrimination could accomplish the same development goals and reap these
small incremental profits by plugging the leaks and providing these products at the margi-
nal unit cost of production. But see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVA-
TION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 133 (2002)
(suggesting that price discrimination is difficult-maybe impossible in reality). However,
this would not have the spill-over effects of the developing country having to create the
infrastructure to produce the pirated goods. Direct foreign investment would still be re-
quired. The experience and skills developed producing unlicensed patented medicines
could eventually be turned to producing lawful-generic or licensed pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The presses that produce unauthorized books may also produce lawful public domain
works or works by local national authors. These tangible and intangible spill-over effects
or externalities are why this Article does not argue for the libertarian paradigm of a strong
legal regime backed by strong technical protection measures that would facilitate robust,
bordering on perfect, price discrimination.
232. Compare MEXICAN LEGAL DICTIONARY U120 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., 2009) (UN-
JUST ENRICHMENT (Enriquecimiento Ilegitimo)) ("Under Mexico's Civil Law, whoever be-
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objection and analyze it in the context of U.S. law. The essence of a claim
of unjust enrichment is that someone has benefited at the expense of an-
other; therefore, the benefited person must pay compensation under a
quasi-contract theory.2 33 Specific principles of the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment that address unjust enrichment in
the context of intellectual property may be more supportive of a claim of
unjust enrichment than those provisions found in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts.234 Section 42 provides:
(1) A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or infringe-
ment of another's legally protected rights in any idea, expression,
information, image, or designation is accountable to the holder
of such rights for the benefit so obtained.2 35
(2) The measure of recovery depends on the blameworthiness of the
defendant's conduct. As a general rule:
(a) A conscious wrongdoer, or one who acts despite a known
risk that the conduct in question violates the rights of the
claimant, will be required to disgorge all gains (including
consequential gains) derived from the wrongful transaction.
(b) A person whose conduct is innocent or merely negligent will
be liable only for the direct benefit derived from the wrong-
ful transaction. Direct benefit may be measured, where such
a measurement is available and appropriate, by a reasonable
royalty or by the reasonable cost of a license.2 36
Assuming that the developed country rights hold actually has a legally
protected intellectual property right in the developing country and that
the Restatement of Restitution's scope reaches copyright and patent in-
fringement, the first factor of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution test
will easily be proven in many cases alleging the violation of intellectual
property rights in the developing world. But there is still the second fac-
comes enriched without justification at the expense of another shall be obligated to
indemnify the other person for his/her loss in the proportion of the former's enrichment
(Art. 1882, FCC)), with BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1573 (8th ed. 2004) ("unjust enrich-
ment. 1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering compensation, in
circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected.... 2. A benefit obtained from
another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must
make restitution or recompense.").
233. See George P. Roach, Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the Defendant's
Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 493 (2008).
234. But see generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT § 42 cmts. a-e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
235. See MASKUS, supra note 17, at 3. The rights holder would not have any intellectual
property rights, but for the developing country's WTO/TRIPS obligations to provide pro-
tection for these rights pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, principles of national treatment,
TRIPS-plus, or other bilateral trade agreements. Id.
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2005). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution seems to add a level of moral
culpability that may conceptually sound in tort law akin to the difference between negli-
gence and recklessness or the various mens rea that distinguish between levels of criminal
culpability under the penal code. One is not more unjustly enriched if he is an intentional
infringer or an accidental infringer unless there is a difference in the economic value of the
right to the infringer.
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tor, the question of the remedy. Under the second factor, the analysis is
bifurcated, and depending on blameworthiness, either the market price of
a license or disgorgement of profits is the appropriate remedy. 237 As
demonstrated elsewhere in this Article, the market price in many devel-
oping countries for a licensed product borders on zero because there is
little or no demand at the licensed price.2 38 Perhaps, the better interpre-
tation of Section 42 is that it may require the developing-country in-
fringer to disgorge profits.
"Profits" is a term of art in U.S. intellectual property law. 239 Accord-
ingly, the concept may not have the usual and customary dictionary
meaning when determining damages in an intellectual property case.
Under copyright law a court may award actual damages and profits.
240
Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for actual
losses "attributable to the [act of] infringement. '24 1 The Article assumes
few or any lost sales or license royalties in a developing country. To claim
profits, a copyright owner needs to merely show "the infringer's gross
revenue," and then, the infringer must prove their deductable business
expenses. 242 The copyright owner is only entitled to those profits that are
attributable to the infringing activity.2 43 Under this definition, a develop-
ing country's unlicensed industries that add value to the uncompensated
use could have a very lucrative business even after disgorging profits re-
lated to the unjust enrichment or infringement to the copyright owner.2 44
Of course, a developing country may want to attempt to limit losses in
this context to actual lost sales.
In On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., the court wrestled with the issue of in-
237. Further, if the remedies under the state law claims of restitution are more draco-
nian than the federal remedies under patent and copyright law for the infringement of
these federally protected rights, then there are serious questions of federal preemption. In
a case alleging the infringement of a utility patent, patent law does not allow as a remedy
the "disgorgement of profits." Compare Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 504-05 (1964), with Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d
1277, 1290-92 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming that 35 U.S.C. § 289 authorized the disgorgement
of profits in design patent infringement cases).
238. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
239. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQuISITIoNs, 4-11 to 4-
12 (Lanning G. Bryer & Melvin Simensky eds., 2002) (defining different methods of calcu-
lating profits attributable to intellectual property).
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2010). In the alternative, because of the problematic nature
of calculating damages and because the damages attributable to the infringement may not
provide an adequate incentive to bring the litigation or to discourage the infringing activ-
ity, the plaintiff may elect to ask the court to award statutory damages. See PATRY, supra
note 76, at § 22:173 (2010).
241. Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 504(b)).
242. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
243. See id.
244. Under U.S. copyright law, profits are limited to those profits attributable to the act
of copyright infringement. See id. Therefore, to the degree that the infringer has added
independent value, those profits belong to the infringer. See Andrew W. Coleman, Copy-
right Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright
Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 94-98 (1993).
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fringement without a corresponding direct loss to the copyright owner.245
In order to determine if a "foregone payment" could constitute "actual
damages," the court accepted that:
If the infringer's venture turned out to be unprofitable, the owner
can receive no recovery based on the statutory award of the "in-
fringer's profits." And in some instances, there will be no harm to
the market value of the copyrighted work. The owner may be inca-
pable of showing a loss of either sales or licenses to third parties. '246
The Gap court then concluded that:
The question is not what the owner would have charged, but rather
what is the fair market value. In order to make out his claim that he
has suffered actual damage because of the infringer's failure to pay
the fee, the owner must show that the thing taken had a fair market
value.
2 4 7
Under patent law, "[1]ost profit damages are an assessment of actual
damages (the profits the patentee [not the infringer] lost due to the in-
fringement). In the event that lost profits cannot be calculated, reasona-
ble royalty damages represent the floor of possible damages .... - 248 The
patent owner "must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) ab-
sence of acceptable non infringing substitutes, (3) manufacturing and
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the
profit he would have made" in order to prove lost profits because of in-
fringement. 249 Under this test, developed-country patent owners will
often be unable to show local demand for the patented product at the
developed-country price, will find it difficult to show they have the mar-
keting capability to serve a developing country, and will struggle to
demonstrate that their alleged profits from legitimate sales are not specu-
lative.250 To continue the refrain, if the fair market value is the market
value as determined by the developing countries' internal marketplaces,
this is not an onerous burden on intellectual property rights holders or
unreasonable price point for developing countries to use to determine
compensation even if one assumes that compensation is required by con-
siderations of the developed country's internal politics. 251
245. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he defendant has
surreptitiously taken a valuable right, for which plaintiff could have charged a reasonable
fee. Plaintiff's revenue is thus smaller than it would have been if defendant had paid for
what he took. On the other hand, plaintiff's revenue is no less than it would have been if
the defendant had refrained from the taking. In our view, as between leaving the victim of
the illegal taking with nothing, and charging the illegal taker with the reasonable cost of
what he took, the latter, at least in some circumstances, is the preferable solution.").
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
249. Id. at 1148-49.
250. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 173, at 12-13.
251. Any calculation of the developing country price may be speculative, but courts
often construct hypothetical arms length transactions to determine value. See, e.g., Stickle
v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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Another measure of unjust enrichment, the increased value to the
party (individual user or end-user infringer) is also unavailing. While lis-
tening to copyrighted music, viewing copyrighted movies, and reading
copyrighted books all increase the "value" of the individual and his or her
capacities as an employee, citizen, parent, and member of the human
family, it is hard to place an economic value on this, if any, other than the
value of the unjust enrichment at the marginal market price of the work
in a developing country. Pharmaceuticals and other products that in-
crease the quality and duration of life are equally hard to value. An indi-
vidual who receives a drug that returns that person to being an
economically viable member of society has received an increase in value,
but any measure of that increase would be extremely speculative-and
even then, not part of the legal value of the unjust enrichment. There-
fore, the analysis once again returns to the question of the competitive
(non-intellectual property premium) market price which this Article
speculates will be a comparatively insignificant price in many developing
countries.
2 5 2
D. COMPENSATING RIGHTS HOLDERS FOR UNCOMPENSATED
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OR A FOREIGN AID SUBSIDY
Developing countries need access to intellectual property at little or no
cost to facilitate their economic development. The TRIPS Agreement,
the WTO, the Paris Convention, and the Berne Convention all have suffi-
cient flexibilities to permit developing countries to engage in unlicensed
uses that do not threaten the incentives that drive investment, innovation,
and the production of new works.253 Developed countries may strategi-
cally weigh the costs of infringement to their rights holders against the
252. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981).
Section 371 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that the measurement of
restitution in a case of unjust enrichment can be either "(a) the reasonable value to the
other party of what he received in terms of what it would have cost him to obtain it from a
person in the claimant's position, or (b) the extent to which the other party's property has
been increased in value or his other interests advanced." Id. § 371(a)-(b). As comment a
of section 371 explains, the first measure is used to determine the market price of the
service or product and this is measured from the perspective of the unjustly enriched person.
See id. § 371 cmt. a. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST EN-
RICHMENT § 42 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) ("The minimum liability in restitution
for benefits wrongfully obtained is the value of anything wrongfully taken from the claim-
ant, whether or not the taking causes measurable harm to the claimant .... In the context
of intellectual property, what is "taken" is often an unauthorized use; the value of the use
may often be determined-depending on the nature of the property-by a reasonable roy-
alty or by the market price of a license.").
253. See generally Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water-How Much
Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
Bus. 287, 288, 301-04 (2009). The "third-step" in the three-step test to evaluate a limita-
tion or exception from intellectual property treaty obligations requires that the exception
or limitation be one that does "not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
[intellectual property right] and do[es] not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the [intellectual property] owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties." See Berne Convention, supra note 101, art. 9(2); Marrakesh Agreement, supra note
118: TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 30; id. arts. 13, 17, 26(2).
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benefits conferred on the developing country and refrain from using the
levers of power at their disposal to force compliance with the broadest
possible interpretation of the scope of intellectual property rights. This
can be done in several ways. Because tacit toleration of uncompensated
uses of intellectual property by industrialized countries costs less than ac-
tually appropriating direct foreign aid, is more efficient at promoting de-
velopment goals, and will have minimal or no economic effect on rights
holders, it is a preferred model for providing foreign aid and promoting
economic development. Unfortunately, policymakers in developed na-
tions will face the politically unpalatable reality that intellectual property
rights holders will shrilly complain that they are losing money, that the
United States or the European Union is losing jobs, and that future re-
search and innovation are being hindered.2 54 This Article posits that the
effect of tolerated, uncompensated uses in developing countries on the
market price, profits, and revenues in the developed nations would be
nominal.25 5 Even if all the demand in all the developing countries by
consumers who can afford a licensed product is aggregated, it would still
represent a miniscule and insignificant portion of the potential global
market, with the sole exception of products that are only designed for, or
especially cater to, the needs of the developing world.256
254. See, e.g., BUSINESS ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, REPORT ON
MISSION, ACHIEVEMENTS, WORK PLAN AND MEMBERSHIP 2 (2010), available at http://
www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/Prospectus_1005%20%282%29.pdf ("The
OECD reports international trade in [counterfeit and pirated] products could be worth
US$250 billion.... [T]he global impact on legitimate business revenue is well over US$750
billion.... The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that C&P cost the U.S. 750,000 jobs
annually. A recent BASCAP report estimates that digital piracy of creative works (film,
TV, music, software) will put 1.2 million jobs at risk in the EU by 2015. The auto industry
estimates 210,000 jobs per year are lost to counterfeit auto parts. And just a 10% reduc-
tion in software piracy would create 100,000 new jobs.... Avoided taxes on illicit products
deprive governments of revenues for investment in infrastructure and other social priori-
ties. BASCAP estimates for the G20 alone put losses to governments and consumers at
over $125 billion .... A European survey of small and medium sized companies found that
25% of decisions to invest in R&D or production were adversely influenced by considera-
tions of IPR abuses."). But see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 183, at
18-19 (questioning the data on which piracy and counterfeit estimates are made).
255. There may be another effect that is outside the scope of this Article. If developed-
world intellectual property rights holders are prepared to sell a licensed product in the
developing world at a price significantly below what they are currently charging in the
developed world, then there will be howls of "price gouging" by their developed world
customers or demagoguing politicians claiming that the licensed price in the developing
country should be used as a negotiating tool to delegitimize the price in the developed
country or to allege that the company is discriminating against developed country
purchasers.
256. There are a variety of measures for defining the global middle class. Some experts
define it as those individuals with between $2 and $4 per day per person in purchasing
power. Others have used ranges from $10 to $100 per day per person depending on the
country. See Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries 8-9
(OECD Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 285, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/12/52/44457738.pdf. It is clear that the global middle class outside of the devel-
oped countries are, at this point in time, marginal as factors driving actual demand for most
licensed products.
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This proposed model of a nuanced enforcement of intellectual property
rights in developing countries is not unconstrained, and it may be prop-
erly applied with no affect on the utilitarian incentives that justify intel-
lectual property rights law. Developed countries should stop turning a
blind eye to unlicensed uses in developing countries only at the point
where there is sufficient injury to their rights holders so that continued
use may result in under-investment in the production of new intellectual
property.257 Undeniably, this is not an objective test but rather a
nuanced, individualized multifactor test with indeterminate factors that
should be carefully weighed and applied industry-by-industry, product-
by-product, firm-by-firm, and most importantly, individual-developed
country by individual-developing country. This would not require a
change in the global intellectual property regime; rather, it would merely
require the selective enforcement and management of intellectual prop-
erty rights through a judicious use of existing instrumentalities.2 58
A modicum of moral suasion may be applied by governments or con-
sumers in the developed world to encourage rights holders to grant li-
censes or to provide their products in the developing world at a price
approaching the marginal cost of production.2 59 The political process has
already commenced to reframe these issues in the context of patented,
life-saving pharmaceutical products from a focus on property rights and
free-riding to a view that balances the patent incentives for innovation
and the actual costs imposed on patent owners through compulsory li-
censes, with the social impact on providing these medicines in developing
257. See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 862 (2003) ("In an integrated market,
intellectual property rights owners are united by their joint desire to maximize gains from
the exclusive proprietary rights and the resulting market power that intellectual property
protection affords. States are expedient agents to assist these citizens in accomplishing this
goal in the international setting. However, securing the public policy and welfare objec-
tives for having an intellectual property system is also the responsibility of the state.").
258. Cf. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 118 (recognizing limits on the obligations of
the LDCs as recognized by the United Nations); Decision of the General Counsel, Imple-
mentation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/L/540 & Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/trips-e/implem-para6_e.htm (waiving obligations regarding art. 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement for least developed countries).
259. See Sara Fisher Ellison & Catherine Wolfram, Coordinating on Lower Prices:
Pharmaceutical Pricing Under Political Pressure, 37 RAND J. ECON. 324, 337 (2006) (sug-
gesting that "there was a political component to pharmaceutical pricing during the [Clinton
era] health care reform debates. In particular, the firms we identified as more politically
sensitive were more likely to engage in coordinated pricing, consistent with a pledge many
firms made not to raise prices more than the rate of inflation."); see also AIDS, Drug
Prices and Generic Drugs, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2011) ("Another significant event in drug price reduction also came in 2001 following an
attempt by thirty-nine major pharmaceutical companies to prosecute the South African
government for passing a law that allowed easy production and importation of generics.
Big Pharma was eventually forced to back down and drop the case following a tremendous
outcry from the international community including the South African government, the Eu-




countries. 2 60 Alternatively, developed countries may purchase licenses
from domestic intellectual property rights holders that permit developing
countries, on reasonable terms, to exploit intellectual property.261 If one
accepts the market value for these products as the fair market price in a
developing country, then the costs of these licenses will be nominal at
best and licenses will be more readily affordable. The value of licensing
rather than piracy is that rights holders may use license terms to protect
critical markets and uses while permitting developing countries to use the
intellectual property in a manner that has a minimal effect on the owner's
profits. Uncompensated transfers are a one-size-fits-all solution, while li-
censing is a customizable solution that often benefits both parties. Fur-
ther, a liberal or low price licensing regime reinforces international norms
of intellectual property and reinforces the expectation that at some point
developing countries become developed and will have to pay for contin-
ued uses of intellectual property. This avoids the slide into intellectual
property anarchy.
V. CONCLUSION
Uncompensated intellectual property technology transfers, so-called
intellectual property piracy, or old-fashioned free-riding by most develop-
ing countries, especially the Least Developed Countries, is the paradig-
matic example of "he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening m[ine]. ' '262 It often benefits the developing country without
placing undue costs on the rights holders or taxpayers in developed coun-
tries. It may ameliorate suffering, promote development, and facilitate
the ultimate creation of new markets where eventually the rights holders
of the developed nations may exploit their intellectual property for a
fair(er) price. One of the intended consequences of the WTO and the
TRIPS Agreement was to close the so-called pirate route, the uncompen-
sated use of intellectual property route, to economic development. Yet,
the WTO and TRIPS Agreement's promises of promoting technology
transfer did not provide an effective alternative route to development.
The new purported road to economic development-developed countries
granting incentives to the domestic companies to promote technology
transfer or providing foreign development aid-is so far leading nowhere.
Consequently, developing nations must once again look to the historic
role models of countries that have successfully developed and follow
these well-worn paths unless developed nations are prepared to develop
new, untried, and perhaps risky modalities to support economic develop-
ment and to also make a significant financial commitment to fund the
economic development of the lesser-developed nations.
260. See MDECINS SANS FRONT18RES, A MATTER OF LIFE & DEATH: THE ROLE OF
PATENTS IN ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 3 (2001), available at http://www.doctors
withoutborders.org/publications/reports/2001/doha_11-2001.pdf.
261. See KINGSTON, supra note 15, at 201.
262. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Copyright.
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This Article presupposes a utilitarian justification for intellectual prop-
erty protection and concludes that properly managed "piracy" in the de-
veloping world does not affect the practical incentives provided by
intellectual property rights in the developed world and its markets. If the
developing country's domestic-use market can be properly differentiated,
segmented, or separated from the export, gray or parallel import markets
in developed countries, then developing countries may follow the rich ex-
ample of the developed world and enjoy a sustained period of an intellec-
tual property rights subsidy without affecting intellectual property's
utilitarian incentive structure. A period of intellectual property piracy
seems to be a natural developmental stage on the road to becoming a
developed nation. Once these development goals have been met, the for-
mer outlaw pirate nation then becomes a zealous advocate for strong in-
tellectual property protection internationally and domestically-thus,
making strict adherence the norm. In sum, this Article merely encour-
ages developed countries and intellectual property rights holders in de-
veloped countries to be tolerant of a limited scope of unlicensed
intellectual property use (so-called piracy) in developing countries on a
graduated scale according to that country's level of economic
development.
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